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# THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, MARCH, 1954

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# THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

MARCH, 1954

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## THE WORLD OUTLOOK

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**T**HE 19th century began in the middle of one of the great wars in history. Later as the century proceeded several other major wars broke out. But before it ended there were some 30 years of almost unbroken peace. Will the 20th century follow the same pattern? Mankind has certainly had its fill of war in that part of the 20th century which has already gone by. It opened with the Boer War in progress. Then followed the Russo-Japanese war and the first world war. After a short interval there were the Sino-Japanese war, the Spanish civil war, the Italo-Ethiopian war, the Russo-Finnish war, the second world war and the international war in Korea. Even this long list takes no account of the conflicts in the Balkans, Palestine, Indo-China, Kenya and elsewhere. Must the dreadful tale go on to the bitter end? Before attempting to answer this question let us take a look back at the set-up in the world of fifty years ago and see what changes have come about since then. At the beginning of the century it was the great nations of Europe—Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia—who sat in the seats of power and whose writs ran throughout the world. U.S.A. was still a young country asking only to be left alone to work out its own destiny. China was an ancient and static civilisation to which all foreigners were “barbarians” Japan had only recently been opened up and had not yet tried out her growing military and naval strength. Africa was being vivisected to gratify the ambitions of the western European nations. Finally what is now the British Commonwealth was little more than an appendage of the “Home” country whose Government was solely responsible for its foreign policy and provided for its defence.

How totally different is the situation today! Apart from Britain and Russia, the countries of Europe have fallen to secondary importance, many of them dependent on American aid to maintain both their internal economy and their means of protecting themselves against external aggression. Britain without her overseas Dominions would be very nearly in the same plight. Asia has re-awakened from her long sleep, and with a population more than half that of the whole planet is beginning to play a part in world politics commensurate with her historic past. The dark races of Africa are no longer prepared to acquiesce in their own subjection. They are refusing to be relegated in perpetuity to the position of hewers of wood and drawers of water. The countries of South America are yearly growing in importance and influence. Finally there are the two great colossi, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., who between them may be said to girdle the world. They meet and glower at one another in the bowels of Germany and across the narrow waters of the Bering Strait.

Mankind is an unruly family, and all down human history men have fought and killed one another for many and diverse reasons ranging from the sublime to the trivial and ridiculous. They have quarrelled over the ownership of property, the boundaries of national territory, religious beliefs, the rivalries of kings and rulers, the possession of markets and the supremacy of one race over another. In this second half of the 20th century the main outstanding causes of friction may all be summed up in the one word "dominance"—the claim of one set of people to dictate to another set where and how they shall live. This covers both the conflict of ideologies in Europe, Asia and America and also the racial feud which is tearing Africa asunder.

Men would not be men if their lives were not governed by ideas; and in process of time it is natural that these ideas should crystalise into habits, customs and taboos. So long as they live in a self-contained unit of tribe or nation there is no reason why they should not continue to do so at peace within themselves and with their neighbours. But ultimately two such civilisations cross one another's path. This is inevitable and by no means to be deplored. History teaches us that nearly all human progress stems from such clashes of rival civilizations with rival ideologies. What is ugly and suicidal is when this clash is only resolved by the shedding of rivers of human blood.

Against this background let us examine the main tensions in the world today. First and foremost of course is the hostility between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. This has deep roots. Fundamentally it rests on fear—not, I think, a fear that either of these great Powers has designs on the territory of the other, but a fear that in some subtle way one of them will succeed in undermining the stability of the other's way of life. Both of them have some solid grounds for this belief. Americans are aware of the presence inside their own country of a number of communists and sympathisers with communism who have contacts either direct or indirect with the Soviet Union and some of whom no doubt are financed by it. Americans are desperately concerned to extirpate from their midst this heresy and the power for mischief which its upholders possess. Hence their support for the excesses of Senator McCarthy. The rulers of the U.S.S.R. are equally aware that America spends money on propaganda in Eastern Europe to destroy the ideology of communism. In fear of war arising from this tension both countries have provided themselves with a shield of buffer countries in Europe who have been encouraged to arm themselves by financial assistance direct and indirect. In Asia also both of the giants have taken steps to protect their flanks by alliances—Russia with China, and America with Chiang Kai Shek, Syngman Rhee, Japan, Australia and New Zealand—and to have island bases in the Pacific.

Our attitude in Britain to communism and to the Soviet Union is by no means identical with that of America. We are not seriously worried at the presence in our midst of a few avowed communists and fellow-travellers, mainly because our industrial and political labour movements—even their extreme left wing—are definitely anti-communist. On the other hand we have been, because nearer to it, more alarmed by the advance westward across Europe of the Soviet sphere of influence including in

that term both the communist regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Balkans and also the large communist minorities in France and Italy who are undermining the stability of governments in both these countries. Having been Allies of both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in the last world war we are much more suspicious of the dominance of the latter than that of the former. Consequently we have had no hesitation in deciding on which side our interests lie. We have strained our economy to the uttermost to add to our incomparable navy a powerful air force, and to co-operate with America and the countries of western Europe in providing a contingent to an army of defence against possible Russian aggression. We have even, not without some heartburning, consented to leasing to the U.S.A. airfields and other bases in our island for American troops. Nevertheless we are under no illusions as to what would be our fate if a war between the giants were actually to break out. Therefore, with the exception of a few lunatics there are no counterparts in Britain to those Americans (let us hope a small minority) who advocate a "clean up" and a "show down" by converting the cold into a hot war.

It is not necessary to discuss in any detail the reactions of the individual countries of Europe. The problems of those who are lined up with the West are in greater or lesser degree similar to our own, with the age-long mutual distrust of France and Germany as an added complication. Inside the Russian satellites there is evidence of internal dissension; for while the rulers and their supporters cling to their delegated power others are chafed by their Russian chains and are longing for the day when they will regain their freedom. But all these countries, on whichever side of the Iron curtain they may lie, must recognise that they are regarded by the giant protagonists as buffer states, and that the function of a buffer is to bear the initial and major brunt of collision.

In Asia there are countries far larger in area and far more populous than any of those in Europe. Siberia is of course an integral part of the U.S.S.R., and the centre of gravity of the Soviet economy is shifting steadily eastwards into Asia. China is rapidly becoming a powerful country under communist rule—a sister nation, not by any means to be regarded as a mere satellite of Russia. India, though a member of the Commonwealth, prefers to remain a neutral in the world line-up, and in this capacity has already achieved worth-while results in regard to Korea. How far she and other Asian neutrals would be able to remain outside a world conflict if it broke out is a matter on which it would be unwise to prophesy. Japan at the moment is filling the role of the reformed miscreant under the "Borstal" tutelage of its American housemaster.

The U.S.S.R. remains the enigma that it has been ever since the end of the last world war. Why did it contemptuously throw away the goodwill felt towards it by its *quondam* allies? Why did it at immense cost to its economy continue fully armed when the rest of the world was disarming? Why were there signs of a change of policy on the death of Stalin and why have they not materialised? Why was Beria liquidated? None of these conundrums has been resolved at the time this article is being written. I will only hazard the suggestion that it is an example of the French proverb "The more things change, the more they remain the same", and that age-old Czarist foreign policy has survived two world

wars and the Bolshevik revolution. But if her present rulers are conscious of this they must surely also be aware of the historic fact that the Russian soldier and the Russian military machine have a fine record when fighting a war of defence on their own soil but they have been far less successful in wars of offence in foreign lands.

From this analysis of the various reactions of all the countries that would be likely to participate in a third world war the conclusion appears to be that nowhere is there any relish for the prospect. But it by no means follows that no such war will break out. It is rarely the case that nations deliberately go to war because they like to fight. It has much more often happened that they have blundered into war because they have used the threat of war (implicit if not explicit) to force their opponents to yield, and their opponents have played the same game of poker against them until one day the fatal decision has been taken. Wisdom demands of statesmen that while they negotiate from strength they shall negotiate with the object of reaching a reasonable compromise and not of forcing their opponents to their knees. The world is anxiously listening in the corridors of the Conference Room in Berlin to learn whether the negotiators on both sides possess this wisdom.

Finally we must not overlook the possibility that a major war may arise from causes other than that of communism. A resurgent Germany may try to force back the Eastern and Western frontiers imposed on her by her victorious foes. China may chance her luck in Korea or Formosa or elsewhere. Alternatively either Chiang Kai Shek or Syngman Rhee may slip their leash and embroil the U.S.A. in a war with China. A modicum of good sense in the principal parties concerned should avert all these catastrophies. But what of Africa? In that dark continent passions are running very high. Prejudices are very deep. Fundamental issues of human rights are involved. Blood is already flowing. There is yet time to staunch the flow and to heal the wounds. Let us pray that those who control its destinies will use that time to stave off disaster.

. . . . .

Since the above was written the Berlin Conference has met and appears to be ending without any major relaxation of tension. It had been anticipated that the conflict of interests over Germany would prove too deep to be resolved in any comprehensive manner, and the unhappy result has proved this anticipation well founded. There was more hope regarding Austria but this appears to have come to nothing. There is, however, still a possibility at the time this postscript is written that some minor compromises may be reached in Europe, and that some progress may be made regarding Mr. Eisenhower's atomic proposals and about a Five-Power Conference on Asian questions. More time must elapse before it can be seen whether the slightly less acrimonious tone of the general conversations was more than skin deep.

PETHICK-LAWRENCE.

## THE DJILAS CASE

**T**HE sudden eclipse in January of one of the most prominent figures of the Yugoslav hierarchy, Milovan Djilas, has to be seen in the perspective of the last three years of change in that country. The downfall of Djilas was too sensational for that to be easy for the earliest commentators. Even now (at the beginning of February) it is not easy to see how it will fit into the future pattern. The Cominform was put in a quandary, despite the first joyous proclamation of a "split among the Tito-fascists". This was a deliberate exaggeration, thought up in a hurry to avoid having to say that Djilas, the protagonist of liberalisation on Western lines, had been forced to eat humble pie (though not by any means all his own words) by the orthodox adherents to pure communism as interpreted in Yugoslavia. For that would have been to risk giving rise to the question among Muscovite communists whether the true doctrine was not after all to be found in Belgrade, which was so drastically re-asserting it. Others might see in it the flaw in the Cominform line that the Yugoslav party has sold out to reactionary capitalism. Others yet again might be tempted to compare the open discussion and debate which preceded the purely political sanctions against a convicted heretic with the methods used behind the Iron Curtain. The Titoists had been able to deal with heresy without a campaign of vitriolic abuse of a man already silenced, and doomed to spend months in the hands of the brain-washers or physical tortures of the M.V.D. before the show trial with its stereotyped marionette performers, the now meaningless farce of "confession" and final liquidation.

Equally at a loss were the sensationalists on the Right, who saw or professed to see in the Djilas affair a proof that Yugoslavia's rulers had only been playing at liberalisation "to satisfy those who held the strings of Western money-bags", and that now they were coming out again in their true communist colours as a preliminary to a reconciliation with Moscow. Then there was the sinister story put out by a news-agency which has more than once caused serious international difficulties for Yugoslavia, to the effect that the Americans had advised Tito to sacrifice Djilas the liberaliser in order to maintain intact the united striking power of Yugoslavia in case of war—a story which naturally enough was eagerly exploited by the Cominform. Then there was the theory that, in revolt against the "betrayal" of Yugoslavia to Italy over the Trieste question by the decision of October 8th, 1953, the country's foreign policy had become anti-Western. This again was belied by the facts, yet it had this semblance of truth in it; the complete ineptitude with which Yugoslav sensibilities and national aspirations were ridden over roughshod by "October 8th" have caused nationwide disillusion and created an atmosphere which greatly eased the way for the opponents of anything resembling Western liberalism to get rid of its foremost supporter.

The Djilas issue was essentially an internal Party matter, only collaterally affected by foreign politics. Only a few weeks before the crisis I had myself been studying on the spot the great changes which the last three years have brought to the political picture in Yugoslavia. One is still entitled to hope that the anti-Djilas coup may prove to be only a tem-

porary swing of the pendulum, resembling essentially, though in itself going much further than, those which are part of the empirical approach of Yugoslavia to socialism (or the Tito brand of communism), and liberalism. Three years ago, during the 1950 elections, I was assured that the new Parliament and the Government would tackle the task of finding a middle way between communism and capitalism. There would be a complete break with Stalinist methods. The power of the bureaucratic caste (which in Russia exploits the masses as ruthlessly as the worst forms of capitalism have done) would step by step be reduced. The all-powerful Tito-communist party would have to interfere less in the running of the country and have to allow some of its executive functions to be taken over by local elected (political) committees and (economic) producer councils. There would be an attempt to restore the incentive of private enterprise, without permitting the revival of private capitalism. At the time this sounded either insincere or completely utopian; how could any middle way be discovered which would embrace elements of two such mutually destructive ideologies? Yet I have just been amazed to see what progress has been made, both in the formulation of a new ideological theory and in its practical application. The new theory has so far developed as to have sounded a note of alarm to at least one near neighbour—speaking geographically—the social-democrats in Austria.

On returning from Belgrade to Vienna, I put to one of the intellectual leaders of the latter the question of a Titoist theorist which I had myself been unable to answer quite satisfactorily. "Why is it", the Titoist asked me, "that we can have amicable discussion with socialists from France, Germany, Italy, Britain, or even from America, yet meet with nothing but suspicion and reserve—often open hostility, from your Austrian socialist friends? Are they still worried about our interest in their Slovene minority in Carinthia?" "It is not that", returned the Austrian. "You can tell your Titoist friend that, because we are such close neighbours and have still so many surviving ties with the population, we can see the real danger Titoism represents to the democratic socialist movement. Moscovite communism has been so thoroughly exposed as an instrument of Russian expansion that it can win no more converts, at least in Europe. What self-respecting or intelligent person would today be duped into joining that vast army of agents of a foreign imperialism, in the belief that he was aiding the realisation of Karl Marx's hopes for the betterment of the workers? But national communism, as so astutely developed by Tito is another matter. To be able to assure the worker that he can become the proletarian dictator by a national revolution which will have no connection with any foreign powers is to tempt him sorely to abandon the slower and surer road to socialism which we will never abandon. That is the democratic road, paved with the free consent of the majority to its further projection. For us, Stalinism as an apostolic force is as dead as its author: Titoism is a dangerous, because a plausible socialist heresy".

The downfall of Djilas, although bound to be regretted in democratic socialist and liberal circles outside the country, does not imply a reversal of the policy of decentralisation, but it is a check to its pace. There have been earlier checks, followed by a resumption of the process. After the breach with Moscow in 1948, Tito had obviously to devise an ideology



which would fire the imagination of the hard communist core of his supporters and convince them that not Tito but Stalin had deviated from and distorted pure marxism. It had demonstrably to save the country from what in Russia is called the "*novoye bourgeoisie*"—an all-powerful, well-to-do and expensive Party bureaucracy which today could proudly proclaim with full right—"L'Etat, c'est moi". It had to break with the burdensome and crumbling system of five year plans tyrannically imposed from above. It had to provide for a more elastic, adjustable and experimental economic system. And it had early to justify itself by results to the masses by providing better living conditions, more consumer goods and greater political liberty. Tito's success in this difficult venture has been considerable. Economic plans are no longer imposed from above. There is no exploitation of any man's labour by another in the factories—that is, no "retention of surplus values"—yet there is a considerable degree of free enterprise. Concerns compete for orders and in profit making. After payment of basic wages, taxation, and making provision for depreciation and investment, the concerns use the remaining surplus to raise wages above the basic figure. Planning begins at the bottom, in the concern, which estimates what it can contribute to the annual "Social Plan", its estimates being sent forward and collated with others by various intermediary councils. Finally, all estimates reach the Central Planning Board, which has to produce a Draft Social Plan. After lengthy discussion in parliament and the press, the Central Board decides on the Plan in its final form.

Politically, liberalisation has not gone so far. There is still a rigid one-Party system, the attempt to change which was the head and fount of Djilas' offence. A few alternative candidates were put up for election last November but of course none in opposition to the ruling Party. Not even Djilas went so far as to suggest the toleration of any Party which would advocate a change in the political and economic system—only the toleration of two separate socialist parties. But although no effective opposition is allowed, there is in Yugoslavia a tolerance of individual criticism, even of expression of contempt or of hostility towards the regime, quite unimaginable under a fascist or Cominform dictatorship. I was at more than one social gathering at which devout communists, indifferent conformists and indignant unbelievers got on extremely well together. Casual acquaintances and even strangers were not afraid to express quite openly to me any criticism they had to make of the system. That the Communist Party should give up always more of its powers of control and interference and finally restrict itself mainly to educational functions was part of the political programme.

It will probably be found in a few months' time that the pendulum has swung back again and that these tendencies have re-appeared. But not at the pace which Djilas desired and advocated in his remarkable series of articles in *Borba*. To regard them as "anti-Tito" publications would be wrong. Tito knew all about them, and approved of them in part. Of others he told Djilas that he was going too far, that he—Tito—disagreed, but that Djilas could go ahead and see what reception they got. Djilas is a philosopher, a poet and a writer, normally a little removed from the rough and tumble of political struggle. He badly underestimated

the strength of the opposition he was causing by attacking the Party members generally as bureaucrats, and aroused the ire of their women-folk by sneers at their manners and morals. He came up against the hard cone of Tito's devotees, the old Partisans. He is accused, justly or unjustly, of surrounding himself with a circle of admiring intellectuals and of losing touch with the workers. He overlooked, it is said, the latent strength of bourgeois reaction, and believed that the Party could afford greater liberality towards potential enemies than is yet safe.

"When", say orthodox Titoists, "the Labour Party ousts a Cripps or a Bevan, or the Austrian socialists their pro-cominform secretary-general, Erwin Scharf, the world regards it as a matter of Party discipline. We have only done the same sort of thing, though we have not even expelled from the Party a man who was proclaiming views to which the Party in fact took the strongest objection, but which, because of the eminence of his position, were assumed by many to be the Party's own views". The further argument that his overthrow was "absolutely democratic" is a little too much to swallow. But it is only sensible to note how much nearer democracy it was than what happens in similar cases behind the Curtain. When Moshe Pijade demanded that the Central Committee should discuss "the case of Djilas", calling upon him only to answer questions put by the Committee, Tito objected, saying "What we want is a discussion *with* Djilas". Tito condemned his actions, but referred to him by an intimate diminutive, and insisted that despite error he remained a loyal Communist. *Borba* of January 18th carried Tito's criticisms on the front page, Djilas' first rejoinder on the second page, the terrific attacks by Kardeli on the next three pages, and finally Djilas' second rejoinder, general admission of error and submission. Even in this he could join issue with some of Tito's criticisms and maintain that in certain respects his attitude had been right. Radio Belgrade broadcast much of Dedijer's defence of the fallen leader. To say that all this amounts to democracy as we in the West understand it is palpably absurd. The diehards may have violently applied a brake to the wheels of progress and pitched the driver out on to his head. They may thereby have intimidated other intending critics. But to do so they have had to adopt at least the manner of democracy to an extent which no other modern dictatorship has done or could afford to do.

Vienna.

G. E. R. GEDYE.

## LORD SIMON AS FOREIGN SECRETARY

THE career of Lord Simon affords convincing evidence that a brilliant brain, moral integrity and an apparently untirable physique are not sufficient to ensure success in the highest offices of State. "As Foreign Secretary," *The Times* wrote when he died, "he totally failed." Political friends and admirers have sought to modify the verdict. Let us



consider whether *The Times'* drastic condemnation is fair to the gifted, dexterous, efficient politician who was head of the Foreign Office from November, 1931 to June, 1935. It was a period of confusion and false values, and the Foreign Office had ceased to be the compact and authoritative director of policy which it had been since the day when Charles James Fox was its first Chief. After the 1914-18 War economics became temporarily more important than diplomacy. Countries on the verge of collapse had to be saved by international financial action, and for this purpose people looked elsewhere than to the diplomatists. The League of Nations was the more effective agency. The Old Diplomacy had in any case become discredited, however mistakenly, as having been responsible for the disaster of 1914; and even for diplomatic business the League was regarded as the better instrument. During the periods of office of Lord Simon's predecessors, Sir Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Henderson, the League had indeed composed some serious international disputes as well as salvaging Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian finances. The British public was in an idealist mood, and strongly supported the League. Moreover it heartily backed Lord Cecil and the League of Nations Union in their efforts to diffuse a knowledge of foreign affairs. They were debated in every parish council room in the country. In those post-war years the public—or that portion of it which debated—came to think of itself as being well-qualified to give an opinion on the questions of the day, and, being also possessed of votes, was listened to by those in authority—and by nobody more than Lord Simon, who, to my certain knowledge, on some occasions preferred the opinions of journalists (as representative of public opinion) to those of his professional advisers.

Not only that, but a new element of uncertainty in direction had been introduced by the assumption of the position of Head of the Civil Service by Sir Warren Fisher, which gave him, in his own eyes, the right to be consulted in the appointment of ambassadors, and thus to influence foreign policy. He also—as recorded by Sir Walford Selby in *Diplomatic Twilight*—opposed the creation of a new Economic Section inside the Foreign Office. He was thus a rival influence to Lord Simon in his own preserves; and above him was the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who was more interested in international than in home affairs, and who, as Lord Simon mildly remarks in his *Retrospect*, “used his prerogative freely”. Moreover the Prime Minister left no record of what he had said to foreign ambassadors, and Lord Simon was left to make a guess or learn it from the ambassadors in question when they next paid a visit to the Foreign Office. It was therefore a period of confusion inside the Office as well as outside; and to add to it Mr. Anthony Eden had a separate responsibility for League of Nations affairs. Lord Simon did not object to this, because, as he says in his autobiography, the duties which press on a Foreign Secretary “are more than can be satisfactorily discharged by a single individual.” He did his best to mitigate the necessary evil by proceeding to Geneva himself as often as he could; and it was there that he achieved, as we shall see, the one notable success of his Foreign Secretaryship.

And to his specially difficult task he brought no experience whatever of foreign affairs. It was my professional duty to pay frequent visits to the

Foreign Office on behalf of *The Times*, and Sir John Simon (as he then was) usually asked me to come and see himself personally and more often than not invited me to do the talking. He regarded me, I imagine, as a sample of public opinion. He once said frankly in a speech in the country that he considered his job to be to ascertain what public opinion was and then to give practical effect to it. I have many vivid recollections of my meetings with Lord Simon (as for consistency's sake I will continue to call him), and it may illustrate his character and methods if I set some of them down. In particular I remember meeting him by chance in a corridor of the Foreign Office, and his telling me that he was just going to the House of Commons and would I go along with him. To my surprise he walked and talked the whole way, without a pause, across crowded Whitehall, going upstairs in the House, and walking up and down the passage outside his private room, waiting, as he told me, for the Austrian Minister, who had an appointment with him. It struck me as strange that he did not require one moment to think of what he would have to say to his visitor; he talked, and listened till Baron Franckenstein was actually announced. On another occasion I was having a conversation with him in the Secretary of State's room in the Foreign Office, and was just beginning to ask him something, when his telephone rang, and he was told that Sir Philip Sassoon was on the 'phone. "Put him through", he said, and to me "Go on with your question, please." So I continued to speak while he was talking to Sassoon; and when he had finished Lord Simon turned to me and answered in detail and in his clear, unruffled manner the rather complicated proposition I had put to him.

His penetrating intellect threw jets of pellucid light on every subject that he discussed, but having mastered the problem he seemed to think his task was accomplished. All he had to do then was to expound it to the Cabinet or the House of Commons. He was quite fluid about policy. The late Sir Malcolm Robertson told me how he had been playing golf with Lord Simon on the morning of the day on which he had to make a speech in the House, the subject being the Arms Traffic. The Labour Party were bringing in a motion against the retention of the traffic in private hands. Lord Simon on his round and then in the pavilion made two speeches, one against motion, the other in favour of it. Both were equally good (so said Sir Malcolm Robertson); and both better than the speech he afterwards delivered in the House of Commons, which entirely failed to carry conviction. He had his principles, even his enthusiasms. The maintenance of civil justice in all circumstances, and the liberty of the subject, were almost passions with him. He was intensely earnest about disarmament. But his mind was essentially uncreative. He had no flash of instinct. He never saw ultimate consequences. His whole concern was with the next step. His legal training had accustomed him to master his brief, to state it before the judge, then to put it quite out of his mind and take up the next case. Nothing could be more disastrous than this habit applied to politics. More than once I knew him to approach an old problem as if it had not been raised before and even come to a different conclusion on the second occasion. Time after time Lord Simon made it clear that he favoured the rearmament of Germany up to a fixed and moderate standard. Yet he exasperated the Germans by

penning a famous memorandum, abounding in legalistic niceties, to show that German re-armament was inconsistent with the Treaty of Versailles. Soon afterwards he wrote another despatch advocating that the Disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles should be superseded by a Convention limiting the arms of all countries, including Germany's on a level with the rest. When Hitler made his own proposal for a general settlement which included the limitation of arms, with international supervision, Lord Simon was in favour of accepting the proposal and pinning him down. M. Barthou however got in first with a blank refusal to discuss it. So Lord Simon said nothing until he got to Geneva, and then gave mild approbation to the German plan. The plan also included an Air Pact on the Locarno model, which Lord Simon also liked, but failed to carry. When he went to the first meeting of the full Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the Japanese assault on China had just begun. "Some people say", he observed, "that this conference had better be abandoned. I say that it is all the more necessary." The truth is that he almost always took the line of least resistance. It was his nature to glide over or round difficulties. A lampoonist of the 'eighties' wrote of Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary of the day: "He is timid, vacillating, wavering, and incapable of conceiving, much less of carrying out, any systematic policy that does not promise to satisfy everybody at every moment. He is therefore a time-serving and temporising Foreign Minister, intent only upon avoiding difficulties out of the House and questions in it, and upon meandering through expedients which may relieve him from the awful necessity of coming to resolutions." The critic of the earlier Foreign Secretary also wrote: "He has a considerable experience but an inconsiderable knowledge of foreign affairs." Both strictures, though severe, might have been written about Lord Simon; and to them might be added that he possessed no sense of timing. He did not recognise those moments which come, usually unexpectedly or incidentally, when immediate action would gain results; but he pondered, weighed and considered every relative factor before making up his mind—and then it was probably too late. "There come rare moments", Dr. G. M. Trevelyan has written, "hard to distinguish but fatal to let slip, when caution is dangerous, when all must be set upon a hazard." Lord Simon never set all upon a hazard, not for want of courage, with which he was plentifully endowed, but because in foreign affairs he was not on familiar ground, and because he had not that inner eye which sees what the eyes do not see. It is certainly true that during his four years at the Foreign Office he had peculiarly intractable problems to deal with. "Disarmament" faced him all the time, and no large-scale scheme of reduction and equalisation was ever really possible for the simple reason that France, obstinately but understandably, refused to allow that German armaments should be brought up to a level with her own. Lord Simon wasted a lot of time trying to bring about agreement where none was possible—in which he had public opinion behind him. He has also been criticized for not leading the League of Nations in a crusade against Japan for committing an aggression against China in Manchuria. It is not part of a Foreign Secretary's duties to play Don Quixote. The United States were not in the League, and never promised to join the League in action.

Lord Simon knew then, as we know now, that the British Ambassador in Tokyo prophesied with assurance that if League action were announced the first thing the Japanese would do would have been to sink the British Far Eastern squadron—which might not have been so easy as they thought, but which they were certainly in a position to do. Here again public opinion, apart from the enthusiasts of the League of Nations Union, supported his attitude. But both Disarmament and the Japanese aggression had been matters for the League. It was in diplomacy proper that Lord Simon's failure was most manifest. As has already been noted, he had neither the touch nor the necessary sense of timeliness. He could almost certainly have brought about an "Air Locarno" with France and Germany if he had not (apparently under pressure from the rest of the Cabinet) at first turned the proposal down, and then set about reversing his policy in a way that exasperated the French Government. A visit to Berlin by a British Foreign Secretary, with the consent of France, might have been invaluable in the early days of his Ministry; to pay it in March, 1935, just after Hitler had formally and ostentatiously announced that he was adopting conscription, raising his army to a strength of a peace basis of 36 divisions, and thus openly violating the Treaty of Versailles, was most unprofitable. It was a shock to Britain's friends and allies on the Continent from which they never recovered. He then proceeded to negotiate a naval agreement with Ribbentrop, which in itself had much to be said for it, but which, coming immediately after the Berlin visit, further damaged British relations with France, Italy, and also Russia—who might possibly with tactful handling have become an ally before 1939. Finally, and again with good reason, Lord Simon has been freely criticised for his conduct at the Stresa Conference. He had by now so keenly realised the position of isolation into which his policy had placed his country that he was determined at all costs to keep France and Italy with us and to show, in his own words "The solidarity of the three Powers in the face of Germany's announced increase of military strength." Unfortunately all the world knew by then that Mussolini was contemplating an assault upon Abyssinia. The British Ambassador in Rome, Sir Eric Drummond (later Lord Perth), was of the opinion that a stern warning to the Duce might have made him reconsider his plan of sheer aggression. But the British Ambassador, incredible as it may seem, was not allowed to take any part in the proceedings at Stresa. No kind of warning was addressed to Mussolini, who concluded that he would be allowed a free hand. Then, when the assault was launched, Britain led the policy of ineffectual sanctions, and drove Mussolini into Hitler's camp.

But the Abyssinian campaign came after Lord Simon's transfer to another Cabinet post, and we need not load him with a further failure for which he was not directly responsible. Let us close rather with the mention of his one notable success, which he owed not to diplomatic but to his legal skill. The Persian Government of the day (like its recent successor) had suddenly "abrogated" the Concession under which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had the right for a still considerable number of years to exploit the oil of Abadan. To meet the British Government's objection Persia agreed to bring the matter before the Council of the League, and retained a noted French advocate to plead her case. He was

no match for Lord Simon, who personally conducted the British case. I was present at Geneva throughout the hearing and felt almost sorry for the distinguished Frenchman, whose skilful arguments were coolly and relentlessly torn to pieces by the British Foreign Secretary. It was a remarkable occasion of forensic expertness and of the peaceful and agreed settlement of an awkward dispute.

Lord Simon was never made for diplomacy, and it was a grave error on the part of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald to give him the post of Foreign Secretary. He had neither the special knowledge nor the right temperament for it. With him the intangible did not count, and half a diplomats' work is concerned with prejudices and hidden calculations. He lived from day to day, skilfully clearing each Parliamentary hurdle as he reached it. He established no claim to statesmanship in the one office where it might have been established. Seldom can a public man have combined so brilliant a career with so conspicuous a failure in the most important phase of it.

A. L. KENNEDY.

## AMERICA'S ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

**A**MERICA'S economy is plainly on the border line between what is commonly known as a "re-adjustment," or recession, and a longer cyclical down-turn in business activity. The mid-December unemployment figures made public early in January reveal that unemployment rose from 1,430,000 in mid-November to 1,850,000 in mid-December, the latter figure thus being three-quarters of a million higher than that for mid-October. This increase in unemployment of over 60 per cent. in two months is a contra-seasonal trend, and it is officially expected that the mid-January figures to be released in early February will show another big rise, probably to over 2,400,000. This would be four per cent. of the total working force. An unemployment figure of four per cent. is not in itself cause for great concern, comparing as it does with nearly twenty-five per cent. in the depression of 1929-1933. The steeply rising trend of unemployment is, however, of great concern both to labour leaders and to the Administration, the latter being pledged to take firm action to maintain "employment opportunities." Labour leaders have often pointed out that the unemployment figures are both always late and not very reliable, and even at the beginning of January they insisted that the figure should be over three million instead of less than two million. Additionally, the official figures do not accurately reflect the reduction in industrial tempo that has already taken place, as many workers recently paid off have not sought re-employment. These people are mainly women and part-time workers who enter the labour force in times of good trade and when employment is easy to come by, but who prefer not to go to any great amount of trouble to obtain fresh employment



when business is not so active. The importance of this is revealed in the employment figure which at nearly 61 million in mid-December was  $1\frac{1}{2}$  million lower than in mid-November, whereas unemployment over the same period had increased by less than half-a-million. Some three-quarters of a million people had just gone back to hearth and home rather than re-enter the labour force.

It is of course quite clear that the Administration is not only keeping a close eye on the situation but has plans to counter any serious fall in industrial output. These plans are well-known to include public works spendings, increasing the credit base of the country's banks, and various monetary policies such as lowering the interest rate so as to encourage capital investment. Tax reductions, higher depreciation allowances, and guaranteed prices may also be used. The efficacy of governmental intervention is probably greater, however, as a means of restraining a boom than as a stimulant in a depression, and it is noteworthy that except on a minor scale these plans have not yet been used in the early stages of an industrial down-turn in any major country. The Administration is empowered by the Employment Act of 1946 "to foster and promote free enterprise and the general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power."

It is against this background then that the President's economic legislative plans as presented to Congress on January 7 must be considered. Defence, as usual, is given top priority, and in the fiscal year commencing July 1954 nearly \$1,000 million more will be spent on military and non-military defence measures than in the current year. The budget, however, which for the current year shows a reduction in government spending of \$7,000 million as compared with that proposed by the Truman Administration, will be further reduced by \$5,000 million in the coming fiscal year. Thus despite the tax cuts that came into effect on January 1, the Administration expects that the Federal deficit on next year's budget will be lower than during the current year. The tax reductions that took place at the beginning of January applied both to individuals and companies. Personal income taxes were reduced by approximately ten per cent., and the thirty per cent. excess profits tax on companies, originally due to expire on June 30th, 1953 but extended to December 31st, 1953, lapsed on the latter date.

The President has now proposed that, because of the present need for revenue, the company income tax which is scheduled to fall from 52 per cent. to 47 per cent. on April 1st, 1954 be retained at the higher rate for another year, and that the excise taxes also scheduled to be reduced on April 1st, including those on liquor, tobacco, petrol, and motor cars, should be continued at the existing rates. It is clear from these proposals that the Administration hopes to reduce both the Federal Government operating deficit and the government spending as promised in the Presidential election campaign of 1952, but is compelled to maintain intact some of the current taxes which, if reduced as on schedule, would cost \$3,000 million in the next fiscal year. Clearly, these proposals have not pleased industry, which for the sake of the Republican Party put on a

brave face when the excess profits tax expiry was postponed in 1953. Pressure will doubtless be brought to bear on Congressmen, many of whom do not at all relish the "Fair Deal" aspect of many of the President's proposals. It is thus likely that foreign aid payments will come under severe scrutiny, notwithstanding the President's remarks that: "Military assistance must be continued. Technical assistance must be maintained. Economic assistance can be reduced." There will be no quibble with the last item, but military assistance will be examined carefully, especially so in view of the proposal to "merge these (assistance) funds with the regular defence funds."

In a tribute to the better economic position of Western Europe the President said: "The fact that we can now reduce our foreign economic assistance in many areas is gratifying evidence that its objectives are being achieved. By continuing to surpass her pre-war levels of economic activity, Western Europe gains self-reliance. Thus our relationship enters a new phase which can bring results beneficial to our taxpayers and our Allies alike, if still another step is taken. "This step is the creation of a healthier and freer system of trade and payments within the free world, a system in which our Allies can earn their own way and our economy can continue to flourish. The free world can no longer afford the kinds of arbitrary restraints on trade that have continued ever since the war. On this problem I shall submit to the Congress detailed recommendations after our Joint Commissions on Foreign Economic Policy has made its report." No one expected the Randall report to be unanimous in favouring lower tariffs or speedy Congressional action implementing its proposals.

The Eisenhower Administration is firmly internationalist in outlook and prefers trade to aid, but the motto of many Congressmen, mainly of the President's party, is "neither trade nor aid." This will be especially so in an election year when all Representatives and one-third of the Senators seek re-election. Any postponement of the tax cuts due in April will be used to argue against foreign aid payments, and the increase in unemployment will be a good point against any proposed reductions in tariffs. The President's proposals can therefore be considered only as the official hopes of the Administration, and in view of the performance of the last session of Congress when few of the Administration's plans received approval, it can hardly be expected that much more will be accomplished in this election year, not at any rate in the way of giving more money away to Allies or enabling them to compete more effectively in the American domestic market.

The President's hands are more or less tied. In the 1952 elections he carried the Republican Party to power, but his own easy victory was not achieved by many Republican Senators and Representatives. In the Senate there are now 48 Democrats, 47 Republicans, and one independent Republican. In the House of Representatives the Republicans have a majority of four seats out of a total of 435, one seat being held by an independent. It is true that the President could, under other circumstances, use his immense popularity and his official position as head of the Republican Party to force his aims and desires on Congress by threatening to disapprove the re-election candidacy of recalcitrant Republican Congressmen. Such a move, however, is fraught with danger as forty of

the Republican Representatives who are seeking re-election this year now hold their seats by a voting margin of less than five per cent., and four of the Republican Senators also up for re-election have only doubtful chances of being returned. Any such move by the President could well set off a Democratic landslide.

The President will be compelled during the current session, as during the last, to rely on the Democrats, who this year, however, may not be in the same cooperative mood in view of the Truman-White-Brownell scandal of late 1953, when Attorney-General Brownell more or less accused the former President of knowingly promoting to high office a person whom he knew to be a Soviet spy. The questions of continuing foreign aid and tariff reductions will tend to turn therefore both on the President's ability to secure the support of the liberal Republicans and that of the Democratic internationalists, and on the internal economic situation. The better the economic health of the country the greater the chances of further aid and freer trade. Stimulation of internal domestic trade by the granting of larger foreign aid payments is not likely to loom large in the Administration's anti-Depression plans.

Currently, industrial production is running at about 7 per cent. below the best levels of 1953, steel output is down by about one-quarter, car output has been reduced with consequent rising unemployment among assembly-line workers, railway freight loadings have declined by about ten per cent., and personal income in November 1953 (the latest figure available) was running at an annual rate of \$285½ billion, nearly \$2 billion lower than in October. All these may not prove to be the beginning of a major fall in industrial output, but merely a change-over from an over-extended wartime economy to a normal peacetime economy with unemployment running at about 5 per cent. President Eisenhower in his report to Congress said: "I am confident that we can complete this transition without serious interruption in our economic growth. But we shall not leave this vital matter to chance. . . . (Plans include) flexible credit and debt management policies; tax measures to stimulate consumer and business spending; suitable lending, guaranteeing, insuring and grant-in-aid activities; strengthened old age and unemployment insurance measures; improved agricultural programmes; public works plans laid well in advance; enlarged opportunities for international trade and investment. This enumeration . . . only faintly hints the vast amount of study, co-ordination and planning, to say nothing of authorising legislation, that altogether will make our economic preparedness complete. If new conditions arise . . . the Administration will still be ready. A government always ready to take well-timed and vigorous action, and a business community willing, as ours is, to plan boldly and with confidence, can between them develop a climate assuring economic growth." These are indeed bold, brave words. In practice, however, there may prove to be a distinction between what economists can plan on paper and what they are able to achieve when the business tide is running against them. The fact that it took a major war to reduce unemployment in America to minor proportions, despite all the measures of the New Deal, is not encouraging.

*New York.*

JOHN BROWN.



## GIBRALTAR AND ANGLOPHOBIA IN SPAIN

**A**NTI-BRITISH demonstrations in Madrid, Granada and elsewhere, come as a climax to an artificially stimulated campaign of fifteen years for the return of Gibraltar to Spain. The form the agitation has taken is a familiar one to modern history—student riots, hooliganism and violent press attacks. Comment in Britain has universally condemned the Spanish attitude, but it is unwise and unjust to dismiss their claim for Gibraltar's return merely because it has found its expression in Falangist rowdiness. For the future of Anglo-Spanish relations it is necessary to put the problem into proper perspective. For the majority of Englishmen there is no problem. Gibraltar is British by right of conquest confirmed in the Treaty of Utrecht. Its capture by an Anglo-Dutch fleet in 1704 is being celebrated this year in the 250th anniversary of British rule. For this period it has been the pivot of British sea power in the Mediterranean and a bastion of strength in four great wars, whilst the 'Rock' has become in the popular imagination a symbol of Imperial power.

This is only half the picture, for to many Spaniards Gibraltar has been a symbol of foreign domination since the British occupation. They view the British in Gibraltar very much as Italians might view Jugo-Slavs in Trieste or, as Professor Trend wrote in 1921, as the English might regard a French occupation of Dover. To think that the present agitation is a new phenomenon is a grave mistake, for antecedents can be traced both in the press and in the Cortes throughout the nineteenth century. The motives behind the agitation were varied but it found its purest expression among the Republican leaders who wanted its restoration as a part of their general anti-Imperialist campaign and on grounds of abstract justice. National pride, which is certainly not confined to Spaniards of any particular party, plays an important part in all past agitation, and Dr. Salvador de Madariaga, whom no one could accuse of being a supporter of Franco, wrote in 1946 "that Spain wants Gibraltar cannot even be discussed. She cannot be without wanting it. The consequences of the retention of Gibraltar by the English are far deeper than a mere political discussion might suggest. It has cut deep into the national faith". The Spaniards, rightly or wrongly, claim it as *de jure* Spanish territory, and this year, with the Queen's visit and the 250th anniversary, the agitation is reaching a natural climax. Last summer Fernandez Cuesta, secretary of the Falange, in a speech at Valencia, affirmed that the return of the Rock would continue to remain a cardinal point in the Falangist programme. Franco, speaking later on August 4th, in an interview with *Arriba*, the Falangist daily, stressed that "the return of Gibraltar was not only the desire of the Falange but of the whole Spanish people". In this interview and in official statements he has linked the prestige of his regime with the restoration of the fortress to Spain.

It is important to remember that there is no room for the public expression of any other opinion; the press is strictly controlled. This means that the government since 1939 has had immense influence over the formation of public opinion, particularly of the youth. Britain's policy towards Spain during this time has resulted in an anti-British campaign in which Gibraltar serves as the focal point of attack. Apathy

may have come from an agitation which seemed to have no ending but now, with Spain's credit running high, especially in the Americas, the tone becomes more positive. For the past year, at least, the Spanish press has consistently seized every opportunity to irritate latent anti-British feeling. This has been done in a variety of ways; sometimes the attack is direct, more often subtle and insinuating, but always aimed at discrediting British aims and achievements. The reporting of news items from England is liable to be unjust and biased, whilst the actual selection of topics to be discussed often strikes the observer as bizarre. Religious differences between the two countries are stressed with particular vigour—always to Britain's disadvantage. Divisions within the Labour Party and news of strikes are fully reported as part of the attempt to discredit Socialism. France may share with Britain the role of being used as a warning of the "decadence of Liberal Democracy", but with Britain there is always personal bitterness. Our policy towards Jugo-Slavia is described as hypercritical in comparison to what is considered as our unjust policy towards Spain. Her continued exclusion from N.A.T.O. is attributed to Britain's influence, and, whereas Franco hardly expected recognition from a Labour government, there was marked disappointment when British policy towards him remained fundamentally unchanged with the advent to power of the Conservatives. The Press has been particularly scornful of past British proposals for a Four Power meeting. To a certain group of Spaniards, who claim intimate knowledge of Communist mentality and tactics, based on their Civil War experience, there can be no compromise between Russia and the West, and Britain has been derided for thinking it possible.

In addition to what many people may regard as valid criticisms there is also a certain amount of deliberate mystification. Gibraltar, in one slim volume, for example, appears responsible for most of the evils of Spanish nineteenth century misgovernment—it was the centre of a "masonic conspiracy" designed to keep Spain divided so as to ensure a constant market for British goods. The continual military *pronunciamentos*, it is asserted, sought and received aid and encouragement from the British colony. A whole literature of "Gibraltariana" has grown up over the years emphasizing the justice of Spain's claims to the "Keys of the Straits". There may be in all this an element of wishing to divert attention from domestic discontent or even, as the *Daily Telegraph* asserts, of wishing to "provide synthetic substitutes for aggression", but it would be a mistake, for that reason, to assume that the problem is unimportant, because it is against the background of these facts that Gibraltar becomes the biggest single barrier to the improvement of Anglo-Spanish relations.

In trying to account for the prevalence in semi-official quarters of an Anglophobia, which brings an edge of bitterness to the question, it is perhaps worth looking at the conception which Spaniards have recently formed of their historical development. Briefly, it is based on the contention that the Spaniards are a race apart from the rest of Europe, and that there is no reason why they should be expected to conform to European patterns of social and political behaviour. The failure to find a satisfactory political solution for their country's government (solved, of course, in the present State) is of comparatively little importance when

compared to the unrivalled contribution made by Spain towards the preservation of Catholic unity. Periods of Spanish greatness in the past, it is asserted, have been those in which she has come forward as the defender and propagator of Catholic values. Hence the immense significance of the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella when the Moors were finally subdued and the great task of civilizing the New World was begun; the Counter-Reformation, where Spain tried to reimpose unity on a Europe shattered by the Reformation is scarcely less significant. The Spaniards' genius is religious, the argument continues, and if, up to 1939, they have been unable to evolve a satisfactory form of government it has been because their civilising mission, conceived in terms of the spread of Catholicism, has drawn upon them the rivalry of covetous nations eager only for material gains. These foreign powers, and England is the main culprit, have deliberately sought, either by the influence of their ideas or by direct intervention, to divert the stream of national development. A whole theory of Spanish history has been built up on such a foundation, and the present "Destiny" of Spain, is seen as the re-imposition of religious unity on a Europe which has erred so far as to become a prey to atheistical Communism. England occupies a central position in this presentation because she represents the spirit of the Reformation in its most unbridled form symbolized in an heretical Church Establishment. But the main bone of contention is to be found in the Imperial rivalry between the two powers. The clash of interests and ideas was expressed in the running fight which began with the piratical raids of Drake and ended with the British assisting the Spanish colonies to revolt from their Mother Country at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Gibraltar, to some Spaniards, seems small compensation for the loss of their American Empire.

The bitter memory of this past Imperial rivalry goes far towards explaining the contemporary belittlement of Britain's colonial achievements and the corresponding exaggeration of Spain's civilising influence in America. The feeling of inferiority which loss of their Empire entails stems from the disastrous war of 1898 when Spain lost Cuba and the Philippines, and it is strengthened by seeing Portugal, once a part of the Spanish Empire, still one of the world's colonial powers. Aggressive Spanish nationalism now finds its inspiration in looking to the past. To compensate for her exclusion from the concert of nations she has adopted two striking attitudes—firstly, the insistence of the Spanish Imperial tradition which finds an expression in the closest possible cultural relations with South American countries, and, secondly, in asserting that Spain, through her Moorish past, is the best equipped nation to mediate between the West and Islam. The connection is not accidental between the Gibraltar question, the crisis in Morocco, and Spanish sympathy with Islam, particularly in her support of Neguib. It is a significant point that the argument, which now says that once Britain withdraws from Suez she will have no justification for remaining in Gibraltar was used for exactly the same purpose in the Cortes in the Eighteen Eighties.

The status quo has been accepted by Spain because her internal divisions and her lack of bargaining power have made it impossible for her, in the past, to conduct any policy which could ensure Gibraltar's return. That this question should become prominent now is due to a variety of factors—

the coincidence of the Queen's visit with the 250th anniversary of British rule, the rising of foreign opinion favourable to Franco, the fact that he has been able, by manipulating the Press, to focus attention on a question which every Spaniard could regard as a legitimate grievance, and the current opinion in Spain that strategical considerations of Western defence seem to strengthen their arguments. What are the chances that the problem will be solved to Spain's satisfaction? It would be essential, first of all, for Britain to acknowledge that a problem exists, but it is extremely doubtful if British public opinion would consider that the desire for Spanish goodwill now constitutes a strong enough reason to consider making any concessions. The general tone of opinion in Britain still seems to be unfavourable to Franco. The Labour Party continues its traditional hostility and it is hard to imagine a Conservative government presiding over the dismemberment of the Empire.

Supposing, for a moment, forgetting the domestic implications, that a solution was sought, what form could it take? There seems to be three main courses. Firstly, to recognise the validity of the Spanish claim, hand the fortress over to Franco, accepting in return compensation for the installations, guarantees for the Gibraltarians, and some rights in the use of the harbour. This is the solution Franco most desires, but it is equally certain that it is the one which a British government and public opinion would not accept. Secondly, some kind of Internationalisation. This might take the form, as in Tangier, of joint control by powers which have interests in the Mediterranean, or control solely by Spain and Britain. Such a solution would require very tactful handling and it is doubtful if Franco would be satisfied even were the Spanish flag allowed to fly over the Rock. Thirdly, it might be put under United Nations Trusteeship; but for the Spaniards to obtain any satisfaction at all from this it would have to entail, as a corollary, their admittance to U.N.O. All these possibilities except the first fail to satisfy Franco's assertion that Gibraltar is *de jure* Spanish territory. This extreme claim could only be vindicated by taking the case, with Britain's consent to the International Court at The Hague, but it is more than doubtful if the Court would admit such a precedent as the Spanish claim would entail.

Like Mussolini's campaign for the return of Nice to Italy, so Franco's for Gibraltar has relied more on its emotional appeal for its effect on public opinion than on political realism. Is Franco's claim reflected at all in practical diplomacy? The final signing of the agreement with the United States has given a fillip to Spanish arguments, for now, they claim, Gibraltar's strategic importance, with American Spanish bases, will diminish considerably. It is not unlikely that Franco hopes that by American mediation, or even with American pressure, Britain may be persuaded to consider Spanish claims. Franco's bargaining powers though are still not strong—he could not enforce an embargo on British goods without seriously impairing the national economy. The immediate aim, by continued agitation, is to force the Queen's visit to be cancelled. If this fails—and the *démarche* of the Spanish ambassador in London made Britain's attitude clear—it is difficult to see what form the campaign will take, but whatever happens Franco's prestige is concerned. Whereas many Spaniards will accept his leadership as an alternative to political

turbulence, it is doubtful if they would support an adventurous foreign policy involving economic hardships at home. Whatever he expects from American support or from the growth of foreign opinion which sees Spain as a bastion in Western defence, it is obvious that any recognition of his claim by Britain must raise the whole question of the acceptance of his régime. It is perhaps time that this was raised, that some of the passions and prejudices lingering from the Civil War were dispelled; but for the future welfare of Anglo-Spanish relations it would be better for both sides to see Gibraltar as a problem to be solved and not as one to be shelved or shouted about.

C. A. M. HENNESSY.

## CHINESE COMMUNISM ABROAD

IT IS just thirty years since one Chu Mao entered the Russian "University of the Toilers of the East", to embark upon the communist leadership course which was to train him for the struggle against the Kuomintang. Today under the name of Mao Tse Tung, undisputed ruler of Red China, he is the spirit behind plans for the communising of all south and east Asia. Throughout the sprawling length of Indonesia, in Malaya, Indo-China, the Philippines, communism's power may be counted a vital force in the teeming overseas Chinese communities of settlers, merchants and—paradoxically—even among the millionaires of that race. The absorption of China into the sphere of communist states produced, as might be expected, instant reactions within these huge Chinese communities abroad. Throughout Asia, minority populations have been mobilised, by one means or another, to achieve the spread of Marxism. They are nothing if not clannish, and what the mother country says, goes. Even Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek's tenure of Formosa Island has not caused such a deep division of loyalties as might have been thought. Chinese are not exceptions to human weakness in the face of *fait accompli*. A former secretary to Chiang, who had fought with the Generalissimo through some of the bitterest campaigns against communism, told me recently how his entire family had thrown in their lot with the Reds. Some of his relatives had been warlords, others prosperous capitalists; all were educated men. "I have given the whole problem a great deal of thought", he said, "and my mind is made up. My relatives write to me to return to Red China, that they are well and taking their full place in rebuilding our country. As far as I am concerned, of course, I may be a marked man—and I will not return. But as for rejoining Chiang: what is the use? China will find her own salvation. It may be through communism, for all I know."

In recent years Chinese communism's role in the world has changed significantly. For over a quarter of a century the accent was upon co-operation with Russia in order to achieve the communisation of the Chinese mainland. As soon as this aim had been achieved, however, concurrently with the strengthening of Marxism at home, Chinese eyes turned to East Asia. Mao Tse Tung's experts are today concentrating



upon two things: the construction and maintenance of lines of communication and espionage throughout the Far East, and the communising of the Chinese abroad. In countries like Malaya, where the Chinese community is strong enough to envisage the capture of the entire country, triumph at home in the shape of Mao's victory gave the Party a very distinct fillip. Next in importance in the attempt at domination of Asia is the huge minority scattered throughout the Republic of Indonesia. Here, highly disciplined units, with their own framework of organisation, have little contact with the Communist Party of Indonesia itself. Prominent among the Chinese leaders infiltrated into the Indonesian Communist Party, however, are Law King Ho, former rebel governor of East Java, and Tak Tek Goan, Sumatra's propaganda chief.

Characteristic of Red Chinese operations in the political sphere is the story of the Chungking Democratic League, formed in 1946, as a federation of a number of leftish organisations whose dominant note was hostility to Chiang Kai Shek's Kuomintang Party. It is noteworthy that at the time of its formation communists were very much in the minority in its ranks. By October 1947, however, the Democratic League has completely fallen under Red control. Today it is a vital nerve-centre for information and intrigue throughout the Far East. In student organisations, cultural associations and business firms, propagandists are at work. Seldom, if ever, of course, is communism's name brought to the fore. The main geographical pivot of this activity is the Hongkong-Bangkok-Singapore-Batavia line, known within the Party as the "Great Nerve of Asia".

This line, stretching via China from the far Pacific to Moscow, leads directly to the offices of Chen San U, in Moscow's Far Eastern Political Department. Information traced to General Li Che Chen, Chief of the Communist Political System in Hongkong, indicates that the main centres of Chinese communism abroad are Burma, Siam, the Philippines, Indo-China, Korea, Indonesia. There is also an espionage element in Japan. Hongkong controls the Chinese Red political Central Executive Committee of Bangkok, the Siamese clearing house for communism in South Asia. Kalinov is the name of the Russian liaison officer with the Chinese reds in Siam. In Saigon—Indo-China—despite the extirpation of a venomous Red newspaper, the *Vietnam Yitpao*, a branch of the Democratic League is known to be most active. Finances for Saigon are remitted from the Hongkong headquarters through Singapore. In Malaya itself, the long, irregular coastline tapering southwards has given the Chinese Reds their chance to smuggle considerable quantities of arms to their guerrilla comrades.

Both Russia and China are known to have benefited by the wholesale smuggling of rubber from Malaya and Indonesia during the days immediately following the collapse of Japan. Nowadays money is supplied for communist activities in Malaya and Indonesia in a strangely "capitalist" way. Strategic materials and machinery which are banned from China or the Soviet Union are first imported into one of the neighbouring countries (I do not intend to mention which) and then re-exported illegally either by sea or across land frontiers. Smuggling is big business in the Far East nowadays. It is hardly surprising that some communists are beginning to wonder where Marxism begins and where

Capitalism ends. Chinese millionaires consign badly-needed materials by devious routes to the Red bloc, and co-operate freely with Moscow and Peking because it pays them to do so. Some—though a small minority—co-operate simply because pressure has been brought on their relations at home. A famous former collaborator with the Japanese is said to be the organiser of communist spying and plots in Batavia. By night sub-agents from the islands collect at one or other of his gambling-houses, it is claimed; the shifting clientèle of such resorts are not likely, it is thought, to attract suspicion.

A large number of supposedly social and artistic clubs are thought to provide cover for communist planning towards eventual revolt. Most of these small societies trace their parentage to the Democratic League, and until recently they were under one of Mao Tse Tung's lieutenants, trained like his master in Moscow. Almost always, documents, reports and information are sent out by trained Chinese couriers, plying between the South Asian lands, and seldom entrusted to non-Chinese, even though these may be good communists. Here, for instance, where even one Russian would be the object of immediate attention, a Chinese more or less would pass unnoticed. Reflecting the increasing scale of Chinese communist activity abroad, coinciding with the present intensification of the Red drive for Asia, is the recent establishment of Chinese travel bureaux, with innumerable branches—even in the most unlikely places. Chinese "tourists" today, like the pre-war German and Japanese agents, operating under this ideal camouflage, have become a feature of most areas considered economically and strategically important in Farther Asia. Chinese and other communist ownership of shipping lines and even air transport companies completes the picture.

While in their organisation of espionage the Chinese have rigidly maintained their exclusivity, their emergence into the sphere of trade unionism has seen no effort spared to unify yellow and other worker within the trade union movement. Thus an excerpt from a dialogue published in the *Voice of the Labourers* in Indonesia:

- Q. What is the attitude of the Chinese workers with regard to labourers of other nationalities?
- A. (By the Chairman of the Labour Association) Our struggle is not limited by nationality.
- Q. But a kind of national sentiment has been maintained by Chinese workers. What are we to do against it, so that they will become entirely internationally-minded in the struggle for labour?
- A. Certainly, only prominent people are yet conscious of the struggle of international labour unions. The masses, the proletariat, cannot yet participate. Their participation can be effected only step by step. These prominent figures can guide the masses to international-mindedness.

Yet another branch of Chinese extra-national communism in Asia is the Min-Seng-She. In conformity with known Red tactics, it camouflages its branches by means of fictitious local names. Closely related with the secret society Sin-Ming Hui, the Association's executive meets weekly, laying plans for propaganda and transmitting information to an unnamed headquarters. According to a report it "uses as an information

channel a weekly newspaper, and maintains contact with a writer who represents the Chinese Communist Party, though supposed to be connected with National (Formosa) China". One subsidiary branch of the Min-Seng-She is believed to be an entity masquerading as a cultural society. According to its constitution, this association deals with cultural, social and educational problems among the Chinese—especially Chinese youth. Funds are provided from Singapore, while from Hong Kong the movement receives Red China's propaganda literature. With an extensive membership the Association runs throughout the Far East sporting activities and debating groups. At least two other formerly independent major Chinese overseas sporting and intellectual organisations are affiliated to this group. . .

The foundation of a federation for Chinese Youth organisations throughout the world was discussed in May, 1946, at Prague, behind the Iron Curtain. Reports state that the moving spirit was one Olga Chechkina, a Russian woman communist of some distinction. Following consultations between the World Federation of Democratic Youth, a Russian sponsored movement, and the Chinese, the "Federation of Democratically-Minded Chinese Youth Organisations" saw the light of day in October, 1947. Among its objects are the co-ordination of all "powers hidden in Chinese youth" and the federation of all Chinese communist youth leagues. Few observers were surprised to hear subsequently that the Federation was being used as an instrument of Communist espionage throughout all territories where Chinese communities exist. Countering this information, the Federation spared no efforts to emphasise that there was no political association or connotation within its ranks. For some reason this claim has not found wide acceptance.

Propaganda throughout East Asia through the medium of Red literature is enormous. Scattered between Siam, Malaya, Indonesia, Korea, Burma and other countries with Chinese settlers, there is a bewildering variety of works. Usually well-written and informative from the communist point of view, their widespread distribution contrasts sadly with the feebleness of non-communist literature. When it is remembered that almost every Red pamphlet and booklet is studied intently by special interpreters, becomes the subject of debates and lectures, and is thoroughly digested and even committed to memory by active communists, some idea of the penetrating power of communism, and its unity of purpose and action will be gathered. Examples of these works are the following textbooks distributed on continent-wide scale, and all found in the library of one communist cell:—

1. Biography of Mao Tse Tung.
2. Essays on Chinese Communism's Struggle Against the Kuomintang.
3. Problems of Politics and the Organisation of the Communist Party in China.
4. Victory Through Unity.
5. The Chinese Communists and Peasant Revolution.
6. Towards One Government, by Mao Tse Tung.
7. How America Helps Japan and Destroys China.
8. The Struggle of the Classes, by Mao Tse Tung.
9. How to Fight Continually, by Mao Tse Tung.



Sumatra, the westerly island of Indonesia, provides the Red link between the communist-threatened tip of the Asiatic mainland—British Malaya—and the eighty million Indonesians. Because of this geographical situation, and the unity of purpose forged between Malaya's Chinese and the Malay-Indonesian Front, the communist penetration of Indonesia and Malaya is carried out, we are told, as one whole plan: Marxism is not affected by national boundaries. The saving grace here, however, is the fact that, unlike Malaya, the Chinese are in the minority in Indonesia. The desperate efforts by communism during the Indonesian-Dutch struggle which terminated in 1949 to seize power were overcome in great measure by the Indonesian national Government. Communisation of Indonesia would have to include the winning over or neutralisation of the Moslem Indonesians. Unfortunately for communism, however, the Indonesians as a whole are not as apathetic as many other Far East peoples. Their present trend is, it is true, towards a form of internationalism, but it is more Islamic, therefore less communistic.

Perhaps the most threatened country of the Far East facing the Red Tide is Siam. The rapid absorption of Thailand's millions of Chinese, however, by communism constitutes less of a political conquest than a national one; for the Reds of Siam today are reaping the harvest of more than forty years of pro-China propaganda carried on by Chinese home governments since 1911. What hope has Asia, and especially the Far East, in the struggle for Communism or freedom? This is one of international politics' most intriguing questions of today. Political strategists both in Europe and America hold that, while India, Japan and Indonesia, with perhaps the Philippines, stand firm against the claws of the Red Dragon, communist China is contained. But it is not yet sufficiently realised that Red China, together with the millions of overseas Chinese as willing disciples, is part of the balance-of-power situation which has much more important implications than merely continental China alone.

SAYED EL HASHIMI.

## COLERIDGE AND MRS. GILLMAN

IT was in the April of 1816 that Mr. James Gillman received the letter which so deeply affected his own life and that of his family. Simple enough on its surface, it was merely the request of a brother physician to take into his house as patient a distinguished writer who, most unfortunately, was a drug addict, and attempt his cure. Mr. Gillman was living in a pleasant Highgate house with a garden which was just then coming into spring beauty. He and his wife were in the early thirties, they had two little sons, and his practice as a surgeon was thriving. Mrs. Gillman was a tactful, gentle young woman, and a very pretty one with fair hair, a delicate rose complexion, and large dark eyes. Her husband promptly consulted her on the proposal, saying that it was she who must decide since, if they received the literary gentleman, the burden and the possible embarrassments would fall most heavily on her. The writer had discreetly omitted the name of the invalid but the Gillmans at once suspected it was S. T. Coleridge. Rightly or wrongly, Mr. Gillman

prided himself on the possession of a ranging, philosophical mind. He had long admired Mr. Coleridge's poems and pitied his misfortunes. To cure such a man would benefit not only the family from whom the deplorable habit had estranged him, but the whole universe of thinkers which could ill afford to lose that mind now sunken to its melancholy nadir. Mr. Gillman thought also, somewhat wistfully, of the pleasure he would have in listening to one who could talk incessantly without ever dipping into the commonplace; to whom indeed the commonplace was only a glass through which he discerned eternal truths. And no doubt he too would be permitted to express his own ideas. But Mr. Gillman, leaning as he did towards accepting the proposal, did not attempt to persuade Anne. She was not strong and was already busy all day long with the cares of a large house and two little boys. There was also to be considered the possibility that the servants, who were much attached to his wife, might have trouble with the drug addict, and thus the household be disrupted.

If Mrs. Gillman, born Anne Harding, had a fault it was that of over-conscientiousness which kept her always a little fatigued and often depressed. She loved and admired her husband, loved and worried over her boys. She was house-proud with a near passion for large sunshiny rooms with Chinese jars full of rose-petals and clean windows shaded by glossy ivy and myrtle. James and Anne Gillman were gardeners and their roses bloomed from May until December. In summer glowing nasturtiums and many-coloured geraniums edged the gravel paths. Mrs. Gillman was not a lady who would see without regret the upset of her mild regime. Yet she said at once that if James could cure the poor gentleman—and if anyone could cure him, it would surely be her James—he must be given sanctuary. It would not be for long, and as for payment, she had heard that Mr. Coleridge could not wholly support his own family, and certainly she and James would not wish to rob Mrs. Coleridge and the poor young people. Although Mr. Gillman had an extensive practice, he and his wife were not wealthy. Neither was extravagant, but both were generous. The letter-writer had said that he would bring the gentleman for inspection on the following evening, but Mr. Coleridge, for it was he, determined to come alone. Thinking it best to leave the scene to James, Anne kept out of the living room. Thus she did not see the patient until a week later when he came prepared to stay.

Mr. Coleridge looked to Mrs. Gillman like an old man, although she knew that he was only ten years senior to her James. His thick hair had the lovely sheen of burnished pewter and his large grey eyes were beautiful but strange. Otherwise, with all good will, she could not find his appearance prepossessing; he was too stout and he walked with a queer shamble; his mouth hung slightly open as if he needed more air. But his face wore an expression of pain, of chronic suffering—not querulous or complaining—which pierced Anne's heart. In his hand he carried a sheaf of printer's proofs as if it were a diploma or a certificate of good behaviour, a kind of promise to pay. She discovered later that these were the proof sheets of "*Cristabel*," which at long last had been published.

She supposed Mr. Coleridge would stay at longest a few months. He had made a vague suggestion of payment; no doubt he attempted at the

start to secure the Gillmans from money loss. But he was very soon so much a part of the family, a kind of brother-father-child, that the Gillmans would no more have taken payment from him than from their little sons. And how could he pay in money? Mr. Wedgwood had arbitrarily halved the pension his dead brother had designed for Mr. Coleridge, and it was not until 1824, and then only for six years, that the king allotted him 100 gns. per annum. The whole household felt anxious whenever the time to pay the premium on the poet's life insurance came around. The worrisome £26 5s. 6d. must usually be borrowed from other friends because the Gillmans could not afford the outlay. That was afterwards. But before the summer of 1816 ended, the household had settled into the comfortable lines which would hold for almost twenty years. At rare intervals a servant would leave and be replaced, the boys would go to school and come home again, but James, Anne, and Mr. Coleridge lived on in amity. There were ill-natured outsiders who said the poet was more lazy than ill; who hinted that the surgeon's office boy supplied the patient with drugs and that the good, gullible Gillman never knew of the secret traffic. What distressed Anne even more than hints that Mr. Coleridge was a malingeringer and that her James had not and never would cure him, was to have people exalt her as a martyr exhausted by the care of a snuff-taking old windbag. For to Anne Mr. Coleridge was not only the most wonderful philosopher in the world, but the sweetest and the best of men. She did not profess to understand the profundities of his thought, but goodness was something she could feel and see: it existed and brightened the lives of everyone under her roof.

Though her mind often wearied and failed to grasp the meaning of his spoken words, he would sometimes write out his thoughts for her to ponder when she was alone. On the fly leaf of her Bible he had explained the intentions of the authors of the four gospels; how each one had written with a special purpose for a special audience; each had found the form which suited his message, and that this was the work demanded from each as an artist, because history must be based on fact but the form must be fitted to the content. She had never thought of the Apostles as artists. Once when she was busy, she made the mistake of sending young James to ask Mr. Coleridge to help him with a troublesome lesson. She heard her son's dubious knock at Mr. Coleridge's door, the genial welcome, James's muttered question, and on that a flow, a stream, a cataract of words, all, all from Mr. Coleridge. "James will be late to school and it is all my fault," she thought, for her conscience was Coleridgean in its severity. She posted herself at the foot of the stair and waited. She saw James walking backward, with cautious courtesy as from the presence of a king. Mr. Coleridge pressed closely after him and still interminably talked. Step by step James descended backward and Mr. Coleridge also descended expounding on each step. But when the boy touched level he gave his mother a haunted look and darted through a doorway, leaving Mr. Coleridge talking on, quite unconscious of having lost his listener.

Anne herself listened or seemed to listen to him for hours while her pretty fair head bent over her sewing or when she walked with him in the garden while he discoursed on the nature of plant life. She observed that he was often depressed in the early evening, and so after a fine day

she would suggest a companionable stroll to a grove of Scotch firs from which they could watch the sunset. Once roaming through the house he discovered that the attic offered a fine view of Caen wood, and nothing would satisfy him but a room up there where the servants slept. Anne balanced this indignity by assigning a downstairs parlour for the use of Mr. Coleridge and his visitors. Thursday was the day when the Gillmans kept open house for their distinguished guest. His dearest friend, Charles Lamb, and his sister Mary preferred to visit on a Sunday when there was not that pomp and circumstance which accompanied the Basil Montagus on Thursdays. Mr. Coleridge had been very fond of Mr. Montagu's second wife who had died young leaving three little boys. She had played the harp like an angel and Mr. Coleridge delighted in music. This third Mrs. Montagu was impressively handsome; Hazlitt said hers was "a coronet face," and truly a crown would have become her. She was also formidably clever and if Anne had wished to be considered a blue-stockings, she must have quailed before her. The Montagu's often brought a guest. Edward Irving, the popular preacher, owed to them his introduction to the philosopher; so did gruff young Carlyle who was vexed because he had expected to converse with Mr. Coleridge but was obliged rather to be a listener; a dour listener and a sour recorder was Mr. Thomas Carlyle.

The life in the Grove centered about Mr. Coleridge. He cared less and less to go on holidays which the Gillmans did not share. The whole family would go to Ramsgate where Mr. Gillman would spend a fortnight and then return to his practice leaving his wife and the boys in Mr. Coleridge's company. In London the Gillmans were frequently invited to dinners given by the friends of Coleridge. James would then join valiantly in the table talk while Anne listened, for she was shy and quiet. At home in the early evening she used to play the piano and sing. She did not attempt Mr. Coleridge's favourite Beethoven, nor could she rise to operatic grandeur, but she sang simple hymns and ballads sweetly and looked so self-forgotten, so charmingly absorbed in her music, that the artist Leslie resolved to paint her as Saint Cecilia.

Anne never chatted with her neighbours on the subject of Mr. Coleridge. She never said what she thought of his living apart from his wife. In 1822 she invited Mrs. Coleridge and their beautiful daughter Sara who was just twenty on a long visit. When it was over she took on another responsibility, that of a friendly correspondence with the unfortunate wife who wished so much to have a conventional home and family and was so unequal to her share of the partnership. Anne had observed that Mr. Coleridge was sometimes ill for a day or two after a letter came from Mrs. Coleridge. Now the letters were addressed to Mrs. Gillman who read them carefully, passed on to Mr. Coleridge items which would not distress him, and wrote long, detailed replies. What was far better, she had managed to clear away the resentment which Mrs. Coleridge had naturally harbored against her husband, so that there was no longer bitterness in the heart of the deserted wife. One of Mrs. Gillman's anxieties was rooted in the accusations Mr. Coleridge was forever making against himself; she feared that foolish or unkind people would believe him when he said he was indolent, neglected his duties, and charged himself with this or that misdemeanor. He seemed to take pleasure in his confessions.

No doubt so gifted a man should expect great things of himself, but she wondered if he did not expect too much. For from the first she had seen that he was a sufferer who had taken to drugs merely to deaden unbearable pain. Sometimes he would say to her like a child, "Here I have a misery," and press his hand upon the place which hurt. When it was necessary, Mr. Gillman gave him laudanum, but Anne had her own little system of specifics. To her harmless remedies she added that of encouraging him to talk because his flow of ideas spoken aloud seemed to blot out the pain; or she would put a novel of Scott in his hand, or bring him a special nosegay. Once moving in her silent way, she slipped a print of Stothard's "Garden of Boccaccio" in front of the melancholy, drooping face.

It had never seemed right to Mrs. Gillman to have Mr. Coleridge live in an attic room with a sloping ceiling, so when he was away on a visit, she had it converted into an oblong box by raising the roof. If the appearance of the house within and without was spoiled, the comfort and convenience of the room were certainly improved. His books covered one long wall. The bed had no canopy but flitted a petticoat of the prettiest flowered chintz. Opposite the book shelves was the fireplace with the writing table and from his chair he could see the beauty of Caen wood and the smoke rising from London far away. Curtains he begged her not to furnish because they would spoil his view. All through the summer Anne would bring him bowls of roses, cut at twilight and immersed in cool water up to their heads through the night. The neighbours used to send "the poor sick gentleman" stiff nosegays of candy tuft, zinnias, and nasturtiums. In winter pots of geraniums bloomed bright upon the window-sill. Everyone knew that Mrs. Gillman's Mr. Coleridge loved music, flowers, and little children. When he went out for a ramble—he never walked in a straight line like other people—children would tag close behind waiting his invitation to explore his pockets for the hard candies Mrs. Gillman had put there. He used to call his followers "the little Kingdom of Heavenites."

The years slipped by. The boys grew up; young James whose strumming on the piano had been the bane of a summer at the seashore, became an Oxford graduate and a sedate ordained minister. Overworked Mr. Gillman had aged in body and was growing old in mind. Mrs. Gillman quietly accepted the fact that she, who had been young when Mr. Coleridge came, was now an old woman. Of that household, he who had entered as a transient guest, seemed least altered by the eighteen years of his stay. Thus it was very shocking to find that he was dying. Anne could not be with him during that last hard week, for she had fractured her leg and was a close prisoner. She wrote him a little note to say once more what a blessing his presence had been to her family all through these years. And on the last evening when he was being borne slowly without suffering over the threshold of this present world, Anne was carried up the steep attic stair to say goodbye. Through her tears she could see that the myrtle she had given him was ready to burst into bloom; she hoped its fragrance would follow him into the gardens of Paradise. Five years later the still excellent but sadly muddled Mr. Gillman died. Henry died too, and the old age of Anne was passed in the rectory of her long-whiskered son James. He was the father of seven



children of whom Lucy, a good listener, was her grandmother's favourite. The old lady, so long silent under Mr. Coleridge's torrential speech, talked at great length of Charles and "poor dear Mary" Lamb, of the Montagus, and most of all of her wonderful Mr. Coleridge. The round face had become an austere oval under the widow's close cap, but what had been mere prettiness in youth was beauty in old age. She was past seventy when Sara Coleridge described her as "very handsome, having this advantage" (of having kept her own excellent teeth) "so that the fine contour of her face remains unimpaired—a Mrs. Siddons in little with sparkling black eyes and a white skin." And it is true that in old age Anne Gillman resembled the noble Spanish saint Teresa of Avila to whom Coleridge had long ago compared her as one in the "ladyhood of nature."

LUCY POATE STEBBINS.

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## THE CANADIAN INDIAN

THE Canadian Indians of today are having a profound influence on the cultural life of Canada, because they are now becoming useful members of the general community. When the first Europeans settled in Canada about four centuries ago, the Indian population was estimated to be about 200,000, and it continued to decline until it was generally believed that the Indians were a dying race. However, this declension stopped at the beginning of this century and since the Indian population has steadily increased reaching over 145,000 today, which is at the rate of 1.5 per cent. annually. Nearly six hundred separate Indian communities, known as "bands", exist in Canada. With the exception of certain nomadic groups inhabiting the outlying and northern regions, these communities are located on more than 2,200 "reserves", varying in size from a few acres to more than five hundred square miles, set aside by the Canadian Government for the use and benefit of Indians. Many Indians live off their reserves as members of the general community in all parts of Canada. In fact, the Canadian Indians have been quick to learn and to adapt themselves to take their place alongside their fellow non-Indian Canadians for among the Indians are to be found professional men, farmers, soldiers, industrial workers, salesmen and tradesmen.

The origin of the Indians is uncertain, but it is generally believed that they came to America in successive migrations in prehistoric times from Northern Asia, probably by way of Bering Sea. They are not a single race, but are divided into a number of basic language groups that are also subdivided into tribal groups with many local dialects. There are in all ten linguistics groups, four of which are found east of the Rocky Mountains—Algonkian, Athapaskan, Iroquoian, and Siouian, and six in British Columbia—Kootenayan, Salishan, Nakashan, Tsimshian, Haida and Tlinkit. Moreover, widely differing physical and psychological characteristics and culture further subdivide these groups into many tribes; the most numerous being the Indians of Algonkian stock, covering an area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Rockies; they include such well-known tribes as the Micmacs of Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and

New Brunswick, the Montagnais of Quebec and the Objibwas, Crees and Blackfeet of Ontario and the Prairie Provinces. The Iroquoian stock, including the Hurons, is found mainly in Ontario and Quebec. The Athapaskan stock inhabits the Northwest Territories and the Yukon, while the tribes of Sioux live in parts of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta.

As the Indian population of Canada is widely scattered it is subjected to differing economic, social and geographical influences, so for general economic purposes it is divided into five zones. Indians on the Atlantic coast are mainly engaged in forestry, agriculture, fishing and native handicrafts, and face much the same problems as other Canadians making their homes in the same region. Those inhabiting the St. Lawrence Basin, South of the Laurentian Plateau are engaged mainly in farming and industrial and professional pursuits, while those in the more remote areas rely mostly on forestry, fishing, hunting and trapping for a living. Many Indians in the Prairies are successful ranchers and grain growers; and those on the Pacific coast are active in the commercial fishing industry. In the inland areas of this region many follow fruit growing, lumbering and ranching as a livelihood, and trapping is the principal occupation in the northern area. The pulp-wood industry provides employment for many Indians in the vast area of the Precambrian Shield, though mining and other projects are now offering new openings.

Since January 1950 the Department of Citizenship and Immigration has been responsible for Indian Affairs, whose aim is the integration of the Indians into the general life and economy of the country with the purpose that they will become increasingly self-supporting and independent members of the community, which is provided in the Indian Act of 1951. Nevertheless, Indian affairs have been protected and administered through different governmental departments since 1670. The Indian Affairs Branch with its headquarters in Ottawa has 87 Indian agencies, each responsible for one or more reserves and bands. In addition to a superintendent the staff of an agency may include a clerk, stenographer and assistants according to its special requirements, and the work is supervised by seven regional supervisors and in British Columbia by a commissioner. The Department of National Health and Welfare provides the required medical staff. Apart from special provisions in the Indian Act, Indians are subject to federal, provincial and municipal laws, like other Canadians. However, their real and personal property held on a reserve is exempt from taxation, and such property, except on a suit by another Indian, is also exempt from seizure. Indians not resident on reserves may vote at federal elections, and this also applies to Indian veterans and their wives whether living on or off reserves. If Indians resident on reserves execute a waiver of exemption from taxation on personal property held on the reserve they may also vote. The Indians are, however, governed by the electoral laws of the various provinces regarding provincial elections; for example, at the last three general elections in British Columbia an Indian was elected to the provincial legislature. As a protective measure the supply of liquor to Indians has been prohibited since early times, but under the new Indian Act this has been modified to allow them to purchase and consume intoxicants in

public places in accordance with the provincial law; the manufacture and consumption of liquor on reserves is still prohibited. As early as 1869, provision was made for self-government on democratic principles on reserves. This has been broadened from time to time to meet the needs of Indian communities, so that Indians can now elect band councils consisting of a chief and councillors, who respond to local elective officers in rural municipalities. The Indian bands can, if they wish, choose their tribal system of electing chiefs and councillors, who have the same powers as an elected council. These councils are concerned with local conditions affecting the band, and they can make by-laws regarding various matters of a local nature on reserves and have control over the expenditure and management of their funds and property.

Indians are financially protected through the Indian Trust Fund amounting to more than \$22 million made up of capitalised annuities and monies derived from Indian assets. Today, the main sources of income to the fund are from leases of Indian reserve lands, timber sales and exploration rights such as, for oil and gas. The Trust Fund is not, of course, owned in common by all Indians, but belongs to various bands, whose reserves are situated on land rich in natural resources. There are also other bands which cannot derive any revenue from their resources, especially those whose reserves are only suited for hunting and fishing. Expenditures from the monies of a band held in the Trust Fund are permitted for any purpose considered in the interest of the band or its individual members. In 1951-52, expenditures were about \$4 million, and revenues equalled expenditure, including \$1 million in interest paid by the Canadian Government on the Trust Fund. When an Indian gives up his Indian status, he is paid per capita share of the Trust Fund of the band to which he belongs.

The Federal Government is responsible for the education of Indians, and the education programme is carried out through the operation of schools for Indian children, though a member may attend non-Indian schools under provincial or private auspices, but this cost is borne by the Federal Government. In addition, the Government has established four types of schools for children who cannot attend school in association with other groups. These include day schools on reserves, residential or boarding schools for children who live in remote areas and cannot attend day school, orphans and children of broken homes; seasonal schools are established at places to serve the nomadic families of the far north. The other type is to meet the needs of children confined to hospital. However, the education of Indian children in association with non-Indians is engaged wherever this is possible. The education of children between the ages of seven and sixteen is compulsory, and the total number of Indian children at Indian and non-Indian schools was 27,955 in 1952, of which 1,190 were attending high school, universities and vocational schools. The most serious drawback in Indian schools is the shortage of teachers, but Indian boys and girls are being encouraged to enter the teaching profession, which will give them the status as Civil Servants.

The health of the Indians has been cared for since the early part of the seventeenth century when French army doctors in Canada extended their services to the Indians, and after 1759 British Army medical officers



attended Indians when necessary. However, the first government-sponsored health plan was made in 1905 and this was extended in 1922 by the appointment of field nurses, and a full-time superintendent was appointed in 1927 for Indian medical services, whose headquarters are now in Ottawa. This service has sixty-five full-time doctors, ninety public health nurses and 18 departmental hospitals and sanatoria throughout Canada, besides eighty health centres. Mobile X-rays, preventive measures and the use of modern drugs are helping to wipe out tuberculosis and other diseases among the Indians, and wherever possible children are vaccinated against smallpox and diphtheria; special attention is also paid to dental hygiene. The recent improvement in the Indian's health is also due to his approach to a better balanced diet, because the Department of National Health and Welfare has taught them how to prepare, purchase and select their food, and supplies vitamin capsules free of charge to adults and children.

Like other Canadians the Indians receive social welfare allowances, for example, in 1952 Family Allowance payments to 18,699 Indian families amounted to more than \$3 million. Old age pensions for Indians 70 years or older cost \$2,250,000 in 1953, and those in the 65-69 age groups are eligible for the provincially administered Old Age assistance pension payable, subject to a means test. Adult Blind Indians receive the benefits of the Blind Persons' Act of January 1st 1952, which is provincially administered. Moreover, direct relief of all kinds is given to destitute Indians, who due to factors beyond their control cannot obtain the necessities of life. Furthermore, housing conditions are improving among Indians, and during the past year 1,023 houses were built and 2,135 repaired on the reserves through welfare appropriation, Veterans' Land Act grants, personal and band funds. Revolving and band loans are also available to Indians for a variety of purposes, especially to farmers for the purchase of equipment and livestock. Tractors and hydro-electric power are now in common use on many Indian farms, and more motor cars are being purchased by Indians. Nevertheless, trapping, hunting and fishing still provide a livelihood for about half the Indian population, but new techniques have increased productivity in these fields in recent years. Most of the remainder are engaged in agriculture, particularly on the Prairie Provinces and in southern Ontario, while the rest are employed in industry and the professions. Thus, the Indians are making a valuable contribution to the Canadian economy and their traditional arts are showing a distinctive expression on the country's culture.

E. H. RAWLINGS.

## HENRY THE GREAT OF FRANCE

**H**ENRY IV grew up amid the religious strife which made the 16th century the most brutal in modern Europe's history, and by his charm and by restoring a measure of peace he united his people. He is now seen as the most successful of the French kings, and it is ironical that this accessible and easy-going Gascon should have been the man who established absolute monarchy. Had not Ravallac's knife cut

him off after only 16 years of real rule, to be succeeded by a long minority, France would probably have waxed great enough to dominate Europe completely, for better or worse, by the end of the 17th century. He was much more like our own merry monarch (his grandson), than like his French successors. Nor was he a warrior-king after the older pattern, though he was an inspiring soldier, hardened from infancy for the campaigner's life. He took his place in the transition from feudalism to careerism, from military to civil ascendancy, in the world of Catherine de Medici where power came by intrigue rather than heroics. It was an age in which the terrific Guises could never prevail over Catherine, a mere politician, not deeply clever but clever enough for *them*; and in England their glamorous kinswoman Mary of Scotland was at the mercy of the politic Elizabeth.

You cannot appreciate Henry IV's achievement without envisaging the state of things from which he delivered his people. The humane governance of Louis XII's time was already a legend. The Reformation had brought wars of uncompromising religious passion and intolerance, and the massacre of Frenchmen by Frenchmen. Assassination, a novel weapon, came from Italy with the Medicis. Catherine, Regent and mother of decadent kings, swayed France for thirty years, from 1559 to 1589. For the sake of God's truth fanatics inflicted hideous tortures, and often endured them sublimely. The monarchy, almost bankrupt, subsisted on foreign loans rather than native produce. The nobility, no longer autonomous, lacked the English aristocrats' *flair* for popularity. They were not a closed caste, but they had the faults of irresponsible privilege. Military chivalry was dead.

The States-General, till convoked by Catherine to try to settle the Protestant question in 1560, had not met since 1484, when they had been fatally snubbed by an earlier Regent, Anne of Beaujeu. Calvinism gained its strength from being a social protest as well as a revolution in doctrine; but it was not an ideal form for social protest. By the time of the Peace of Fleix in 1580 France had already suffered seven Catholic-Protestant wars, and before the St. Bartholomew there had been massacres in 1535, 1559 and 1562. Henry II, killed in a tourney in 1559, had yearned for peace at home and abroad and a working compromise with the Huguenots, but his death left France crippled by the Treaty of Chateau-Cambrésis and its wholesale territorial surrender to Philip of Spain. The fury of Bartholomew's day 1572, unleashed by Henry of Navarre's wedding with Margaret of Valois, was the overflow of a boiling cauldron. The Renaissance had truly liberated the educated mind, but Calvinism and its reply, the Jesuit counter-reformation, revived the horrors of medieval bigotry unmellowed by the calmness of medieval assurance.

Henry's maternal grandfather, though king only of a hopelessly truncated Navarre, had been allowed by Francis I to marry Margaret of Angoulême, the delightful authoress of the *Heptaméron*. Their daughter Jeanne d'Albret, who succeeded to the phantom sceptre, married Antony of Bourbon, a good-hearted, fascinating, unreliable soldier. They were both Huguenots, and Antony can fairly be called the lost leader of the cause, which found a more loyal captain in his brother Condé. Neither prince had much feeling for religion, and Henry IV inherited something

of their indifference. He was born in his grand-parents' capital, Pau in Béarn, on December 13, 1553, two elder brothers having died in infancy through carelessness. His upbringing was Spartan. Jeanne d'Albret was a woman of very different *timbre* from the dominant ladies of the French court. She had her mother's lively intelligence, straitened by a Puritanical severity. She was not the woman to handle or flatter Catherine, or Margaret of Valois, but after her husband's death in 1562 she made herself and her tiny kingdom respected. From her came Henry's element of greatness and from his father the *bonhomie* and readiness of tongue that humanised the French throne for a brief vital period. His father's early death, his campaigning as a mere boy, the horrors of the St. Bartholomew, succession to the crown of Navarre at 18 and to the leadership of the French *Politiques* in 1576 did something to sober his native ebullience. But at the time of the *noces vermeilles* with the "supersubtle Venetian" Margaret he was still conscious of rusticity. The bride, sterile like her brothers—whose childlessness brought Henry IV to the throne of France—had a better regulated head than Charles IX or Henry III, but even less heart. Her acute, shallow, sophisticated sensibility recoiled swiftly from her husband, and she was one of the few women the susceptible Béarnais never loved. His gay and gentle courage, his homely wit, his sun-browned skin and ruddy lips, made no impression on the urbane, subtly-sensual Italian. The bloodiest marriage in history was a complete anticlimax. Unhappily for the next century, he waited 26 years for the divorce that could allow him a direct heir.

Henry of Navarre had little of the austerity or the resentments of the persecuted Calvinists. But it was just this which in the long run enabled him to strengthen Protestantism in France. A zealot would not have been tolerated by Charles IX or Henry III as heir, and the aid of the trimming *politiques* was essential against the "League" of the Guises. He probably did not say "Paris vaut bien une Messe" but he felt that France was worth a compromise, and he saw as possible a far more liberal religious duality than either Henry II or Catherine or Henry III had dreamed of. In fact the toleration of two faiths, two conflicting Christianities, was a novel idea—in France, at least. Toleration had been a mere *modus vivendi*, engendered in a spirit of politic compromise. Neither a l'Hôpital nor a d'Aubigné really believed the lion could lie down with the lamb. The uncompromising Gallic mentality of Calvin had made the organisation of the Huguenots a formidable thing, but it was unsuited to capture the superstitious majority in France.

Though we may smile at Henry's famous remark that "the King of France is a good Catholic", he was never a real Calvinist. He saved the situation by heading the *Politiques*, the party of the fewest zealots. From that moment he was a European figure: the support of Elizabeth and the anxious animosity of Philip were fixed. Henry III's heir, the arch-foe of Henri de Guise, was a man whose imagination ran to European confederation, a United States of Christendom. His rout of the Catholics under Joyeuse at Coutras in 1581 was a reminder that Protestantism might be established in France by *force majeure*. The conqueror, if not very devout, did not seem a man likely to turn his coat as his father and Montmorency had done. Yet by 1588 the Catholic absolutists under Guise

were powerful enough to turn the decadent Henry III out of Paris. Then, on the "day of the barricades" the over-confident Guise was treacherously murdered by the king's orders. The assassination of Henry III himself soon after brought the survivor of the "three Henrys" to the nominal succession in a heavy hour. The outlook both for the monarchy and France herself was grim. A confessed Protestant could not be crowned and the country was desperately in need of peace and a strong hand. The peasants were poorer than in the middle ages, trade was at a low ebb owing to the intestinal and foreign wars, and the crown itself was heavily in debt to foreign bankers. The kings had adhered to the Catholic cause so firmly partly because of the various financial interests involved: the church was rich, as in England before Henry VIII's attack.

The conception of monarchy in France was neither medieval nor constitutional: loyalty was a personal feeling for the king. Henry of Navarre had the gift of attracting men to follow the "white plume." His gaiety and good-humour were infectious. To read his letters to his followers even today is suddenly to breathe the fresh air of early morning. He was amazingly easy with high and low—democratic, however, is not quite the word. Even in his amorousness he was sweet-tempered and free of jealousy, and if he rarely felt deeply his emotions were spontaneous and almost boyish. The romance of Corisande, whom he did not love for her looks, and who with all her whimsies made no demands on him, is a true romance. Many stories illustrate his Gascon affability. He was taken to task for allowing a Jesuit to lecture him for attending worship surrounded by his lady-loves, and urged to punish the man. Instead, he called on him, thanked him for the sermon, and begged him only to do it less publicly next time, for appearance's sake. One day out hunting he sat down to dinner at a village inn, and asked for some local wag to be sent to entertain him. His love-affairs were well known. He asked the rustic's name. "Paillard" was the answer. "What is the difference" enquired the king "between *Paillard* and *Gaillard*?" "As much as the breadth of this table", replied the bold yokel. "Ha!" cried Henry "excellent—I had not looked for so great a wit in so small a place." The French rejoiced to have a Gascon instead of an Italian as their liege-lord. Here was a man to hunt with—and to die for.

But a Protestant could not take Paris or ascend the throne. Much beside the coronation oath forbade it. After six years of nominal reign, long after he had defeated the Guise cohorts under Mayenne in the great battles of Arques and Ivry, he resigned himself to the belief that the future of France was in truth worth a Mass. Margaret of the *Heptaméron* would have agreed, but not Jeanne d'Albret. The Parisians rose to him almost as one man, and the foreign troops who had defended the city slunk away, unmolested. Nothing of his quality was strained, least of all the quality of mercy. The saviour of the Huguenots had more of the temper of a Zwingli in him than of a Calvin, and had he read more—he read nothing but Plutarch and books on agriculture—the form of Protestantism in France might have been broadened. But Henry took the terror out of apostasy.

With all his buoyancy the friend of Coligny and survivor of the "Bartholomew" was no easy optimist or bland escapist. "Many have

betrayed, but none has deceived me" was his best remembered observation. Queen Elizabeth upbraided him most sardonically for his conformity, but she came to recognise him as an equal in character, if not in statecraft. After only four years of power he was able to conclude the Treaty of Vervins (1598) with Spain, and his weary land gained some peace. Compared with Chateau-Cambrésis, Vervins was a diplomatic triumph. It was a more delicate feat to come to terms with the Holy See. The Pope yielded much to Henry's firmness—the King of France was a great Catholic power—and Henry in return had the heir-presumptive Condé educated in the orthodox faith and recalled the Jesuits, whom he had banished, declaring them "by Edict, an essential of my State." The Edict of Nantes is his most famous achievement, but it is doubtful if even with better fortune it could have survived. It went too dangerously far in creating a state within a state, and only on these lines really advanced on the Poitiers Edict of 1576 and even on the Edict of Toleration conceded by the wary Catherine in 1562. Henry interpreted his own Edict too liberally for orthodox taste; and the Huguenots would not realise that it was fatal to expect more.

Though himself a good administrator, Henry owed his most impressive reorganisation, that of the finances, to Bethune, whom he early appreciated, and created Duke of Sully. Their outlooks were antithetical. Concentrated on tilling and grazing, "the twin breasts of France," the unattractive Ordnance officer doubled the state income. He disagreed with his master's experiments in industry and handicrafts, and Henry was content to disagree. Sully's innovation *Paulette*, imposing an annual tax on judicial officers and making them hereditary, not only enriched the state but created a *noblesse de robe*, which furnished the best judges of the 17th century. It is a classic example of the vindication of the indefensible. Sully in his Memoirs exaggerates his mentorship of his master, but his cautions helped to keep Henry's statecraft apart from his multitudinous loves. Criminally careless the king was—which made it easy for a fanatic to kill him—but he was hardly ever venal. He would have made his beloved Gabrielle d'Estrées queen when divorce seemed justifiable, a popular but unstatesmanlike course. Her tragic death from eclampsia set his feet on duty's path again; and his second queen, Mary de Medici, was as little desired as desirable. Unhappily the 17th century kings favoured her rather than him. He thrashed the Dauphin for petty cruelty, but was not spared to discipline him long enough, and the intrigues of Catherine were revived, in feebler hands. It is now as much out of fashion to condemn Henry for "debauchery" as to exalt him for religious enlightenment. His last passion, for the 16-year-old Charlotte de Montmorency, whom he married to Condé, nearly provoked trouble with Holland, and its boyish violence was in keeping with his unchanged nature. Among many problems intensified by his murder, it was the only one happily resolved. He was no Casanova, but his fullness of life overflowed into an affection in which there was no calculation or vanity.

The longer one contemplates him, the more prominently his English grandson's features appear. He was a greater and wiser Charles. We see the same wit, *bonhomie*, freedom from jealousy or malice; and also the same levity and thriftlessness. Both were emotionally pliable, and yet a



common vein of cynicism ran through them, reaching sometimes in the bigger man a compassionate disillusion: he tolerated those who had failed him, the erring humanity who wanted him to "string the bow of my business with the cord of their passions." Both drifted in later life towards a religion of authority.

There is an authentic smack of Old Rowley in Henry's retort to his insufferable Henriette d'Enragues, who asked him pertly when his "Banker-queen" was due to arrive at the Louvre. "As soon, madame, as I have cleared all the harlots out of my court." He was distinguished, too, by that primitive aversion from soap-and-water which passed through Charles to Charles' natural grandson Topham Beauclerk, Dr. Johnson's friend. ("Poor Beau—thy body all dirty and thy mind all clean"!) It would not be too fanciful to surmise that when he browsed on his favourite Plutarch, Henry loved, besides studying, say, Pericles' career, to read about Mark Antony. Perhaps the one charge that will continue to be laid against the character of Henry the Great is a certain superficiality. His deepest feelings never lasted long.

H. P. COLLINS.

## PEOPLES IN TRUST

**A**LTHOUGH on most of the major international problems of the day the sixty member-states of the United Nations align themselves on either side of an East-West dividing line, there still remain one or two issues upon which the normal pattern breaks down. The question of the United Nations Trust Territories is one such issue, for in this case the handful of Powers which administer these territories tends to draw together in mutual defence against the rest of the world. This is the more unfortunate because the Trusteeship system, as enshrined in the Charter, expresses in exemplary fashion the high ideals of those who met to create the United Nations organisation at San Francisco in 1945. In furtherance of international peace and security, the Trusteeship Council is adjured to: "... promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence in accordance with the circumstances of each territory and the wishes of its people; and as may be provided by the terms of each Trusteeship agreement; ... to encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world."

It is further laid down in the Charter that the Trusteeship system shall apply only to those territories placed voluntarily under its *aegis* by the administration concerned. Each territory thus laid under international trusteeship becomes the subject of an individual agreement which must be initiated by the "states directly concerned" and approved by the General Assembly. Although the existing Trusteeship agreements vary as to details, a common two-fold thread of rights and duties runs through them all. Upon the administering authority is placed the obligation of



maintaining "peace, order and good government", of protecting native rights, of developing education and "... subject only to the requirements of public order" of guaranteeing freedom of religion, speech, the press, assembly and petition. Additionally, the Administering Authority is charged with the duty of leading the native peoples along the path to eventual self-government. It must also observe towards the other members of the United Nations a form of most-favoured-nation treatment in social, economic, industrial and commercial matters, "... provided that the interests of the inhabitants of the territory come first."

These formidable duties incumbent upon the Administering Authority, are, however, balanced by certain compensatory rights. For example, the Authority possesses full powers of legislation, administration and jurisdiction in the territory. A Trust Territory may be associated with an adjacent Colonial possession in a customs, fiscal or administrative union. The Administering Power is permitted to establish military bases and fortifications in Trust Territories and may raise volunteers to serve with defence forces in fulfilment of obligations towards the Security Council or for local defence. The Authority can organise public works "... on conditions it thinks just", can create fiscal and other monopolies where these are considered beneficial and arrange for the cooperation of the Territory in regional organisations. General surveillance over the activities of the Administering Powers is vested in the Trusteeship Council whose somewhat cumbersome membership arrangements occasionally bring some strange bed-fellows into unusually close cooperation. Since all Administering Powers have *ex officio* seats on the Council, Britain, the United States, France, Belgium, Australia and New Zealand have a permanent right to be heard. (Italy, however, although responsible for Somaliland, cannot take a full seat on the Council since it is not a member of the United Nations; a compromise solution permits the Italian representative to speak but not to vote.) Permanent membership is also granted to those "Big Five" members of the Security Council who are not Administering Powers, which gives places to the Soviet Union and Nationalist China. As many other members as are needed to ensure that total membership is evenly divided between Administering and non-Administering countries are then elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly in plenary Session. The current membership under this head comprises Haiti, El Salvador, Syria and India.

This assembly of "have" and "have-not" powers both large and small presides over the affairs of eleven Trust Territories located in Africa and the Pacific. Largest of the territories is Tanganyika, whose 7,000,000 Africans are under British Trusteeship. Other British-administered territories in Africa include Togoland and the Cameroons which between them support a native population of some 1,500,000. Parts of both these territories are also under French Trusteeship, the division of these areas between Britain and France being a perpetuation of the arrangement decided at Versailles as part of the Mandate system of the League of Nations. To complete the list of African Trust Territories, comes Ruanda-Urundi under Belgian control. With an estimated population of nearly 4,000,000 natives packed into 55,000 square kilometres, it ranks as Africa's most densely populated territory. In the Pacific region the Trust

Territories comprise groups of numerous islands with all the problems associated with scattered communities. Australia is responsible for the Trust Territory of New Guinea which contains more than 600 islands with an approximate land area of 93,000 square miles and an estimated population of about a million Melanesians, Papuans, Micronesians and Polynesians. Western Samoa, a group of islands with a total land area of no more than 5,263 acres, is administered by Australia on behalf of the British Commonwealth.

All these territories in Africa and the Pacific are held in trust to the United Nations by the same powers which previously held them on behalf of the League. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, now administered by the United States, was formerly held as a mandate by Japan. The main distinction now, apart from the substitution of the U.S.A. for Japan, is the fact that this territory is administered as a *strategic* area. This means in practice that the Security Council assists the Trusteeship Council in the discharge of its duties. There remains Somaliland—the latest Trust Territory—which has been placed under Italian Trusteeship for a definitive period which comes to an end in 1960. Some twenty million people in the Trust Territories look to the Trusteeship Council to watch over its interests. Certainly the Council is seized of formidable powers with which to carry out this task. It considers reports submitted by the administering authorities and accepts petitions sent in by the indigenous inhabitants. Periodically the Council sends Visiting Missions to undertake detailed inspections of conditions in Trust Territories. Some of the actions of the Council (many of whose members have no conception of the many problems which beset a Colonial power) understandably arouse the ire of Administering Authorities who have learned from long years of experience the virtue of hastening slowly in the matter of political advance in under-developed countries. Yet on the whole, and particularly at more recent sessions of the Council, the opinion has gained ground that the periodic onus laid on Administering Authorities to explain and defend their policy has its positive side. A Colonial Power which has stood at the bar of Trusteeship Council opinion and has defended its Trusteeship policy against all comers, learns thereby much of value in regard to its general policy in regard to non-self-governing territories not covered by Trusteeship agreements. This "learning through discussion" is the more welcomed by Administering Powers since there are no sanctions by which the Council can enforce its decisions except to the extent that an Administering Authority, conscious of any short-comings, might feel disposed to bow voluntarily before the consensus of Council opinion.

That the Council can also provide a valuable sounding board for the discussion of general problems of interest to all powers responsible for non-self-governing territories was instanced at the most recent (Twelfth) session of the Council, held at United Nations New York Headquarters during June and July 1953. Of several items of wide appeal which figured on the agenda, two deserved particular attention, namely the rural economic development of Trust Territories and educational advancement in Trust Territories. Questions of this nature reveal the Trusteeship Council at its best, and to the not inconsiderable talents at the disposal of the Council itself can be added the varied expertise of the Specialised

Agencies whose terms of reference cover these fields. The briefest geographical survey of the Trusteeship Territories will underline the need for studies in rural economics; it requires little knowledge of conditions in these territories to indicate the urgency of educational problems.

Apart from general discussions of this nature, and the ventilation of views on such hardy annuals as the problem of administrative unions as they affect Trust Territories, a great deal of the Council's time is concerned with consideration of the reports of Visiting Missions which examine conditions of the various territories from time to time. The latest region to be the subject of a Visiting Mission was the Pacific, where the territories of New Guinea, Pacific Islands, Nauru and Western Samoa were inspected by a team consisting of representatives of France, the United Kingdom, Syria and the Dominican Republic. In general, the Visiting Mission's report, and the subsequent discussion thereon at Trusteeship Council level reveal a constructive approach to the problems dealt with. The Council's President at the time, Mr. Leslie Knox Munro of New Zealand (himself the permanent representative of an Administering Power) was able to describe this section of the Council's work thus: "An encouraging picture of continued improvement in each of the five territories was revealed both by the detailed interrogation of the Special Representatives and by the various reports submitted to the Council."

Regarded by many of the Council's well-wishers as one of the least happy features of its work is the prominence given to petitions from the inhabitants of Trust Territories. Although the last-resort right of aggrieved natives to appeal over the heads of their immediate lords and masters will be granted by all fair-minded observers, the fact that no fewer than 395 petitions from individuals and organisations were presented at the Council's most recent session will be taken as an indication that some overhauling of the procedure is required. It should be added that no fewer than 54 meetings of the Committee on Petitions were required to deal with this mass of complaints which ranged from petty personal grievances to important economic and social issues. In many cases the petitioners were referred back to their Administering Authorities. To suggest that the machinery of petitioning should be reformed is not, however, to advocate the complete abolition of a privilege which acts as a useful safety valve for native opinion. Nor can any valid criticism be advanced against the practice of severely cross-examining the Special Representative of an Administering Power whenever the Council is examining the reports on conditions in the territories concerned. An Administering Power enters voluntarily into a Trustee agreement, realising all the obligations such a step entails. Whilst it is understandable that a Special Representative should be tempted to hit back when subjected to the Council's "third degree", it is nevertheless a matter of note that this cut and thrust of debate often serves a double purpose. On the one hand, the Administering Powers frequently temper their policies to the winds of criticism; contrariwise, non-Administering members have been known to modify their line of criticism in the light of replies made by Trustee Powers in previous Council sessions.

It would be true to say that the Trusteeship Council, after some initial teething troubles, has settled down into a routine which satisfies both

sides of the Council table. What is an increasing source of worry to the Colonial Powers of the world is the growing tendency to blur the line between Trust Territories proper and non-self-governing territories, which lie outside the Trusteeship system. This tendency to telescope two subjects arises out of the United Nations set-up under which Trustee and non-self-governing matters meet in the Fourth Committee on their way to the General Assembly. In the event, criticism of the policies of Colonial Powers in respect of their Colonial territories become confused with criticisms of the same Powers in regard to their Trust Territories, to the detriment of both. This is not to deny the right of the United Nations to deliver its opinions on the subject of non-self-governing territories. The point which can reasonably be made, however, is that any action proposed on Trust Territories (which Administering Powers accept as being within the scope of the Charter) should be separated from proposals affecting the non-self-governing territories of the same Powers (who dispute the Council's competence in this matter). It is to be hoped that a means will be found to make this distinction more clear in future. In this way, there will be a more ready acceptance of the Trusteeship principle, which already commands wide respect in many quarters—not least among those Powers who have assumed the not inconsiderable obligations associated with the holding of Trust Territories.

ERIC FORD.

## NATURE STUDY IN THE HOLY LAND

IT is the natural result of the greatly increased number of trained naturalists in the Holy Land since the University of Jerusalem admitted students during the war, and of the courses at the Tel Aviv Biological Institute, the Rehovoth Research Station and the agricultural colleges, that natural history research in Israel has, since the establishment of this post-war state, attained a level undreamed of by Canon Tristram and the pioneers who trekked by camel and caravan to record the birds, beasts and plants of a land so prominent in Biblical literature. No longer is Palestine merely the collecting ground for specimens to be taken out of the country for the museums of the west. No longer is the amateur naturalist without guidance and authority in his own land. The recent summer conference of the Israel Botanical Society was concerned mainly with the problem of preserving plant life from destruction by the encroachment of the many new and expanding settlements. Its remedy was to ask the Government to place them under the care of a suitable body. Certain tropical enclaves in the Dead Sea shore, the papyrus bed of Lake Huleh swamp which is rapidly being drained and developed, and haunts near Acre of *Iris Grant-Duffii* and on Mount Carmel of *Lilium candidum* are typical examples. The members of the Palestine (Israel) Ornithologists' Union are also concerned about the destruction of such fish-eating birds as darters, pygmy cormorants, purple herons and other predatory visitors attracted to the carp-breeding ponds which are now such an essential part of the nation's difficult food supply that the settlers destroy such birds as vermin. There is also concern about the changes at Lake Huleh,

the Biblical Waters of Merom, in the upper Jordan valley, where breeding haunts of marbled teal and white-eyed ferruginous duck, of purple heron, Cetti's warbler, the stentorian reed-warbler, black tern, common tern, little ringed plover and several other interesting birds are endangered by Yibbush Ha'Huleh, the scheme which with American mechanical aid is clearing over 13,000 acres of the famous papyrus swamp and widening and deepening the Jordan outflow in order to establish 2,000 new farms. In winter the swamp is one of the greatest resorts of wildfowl in the Near East. The sea fisheries research station at Haifa has made an extensive study of the shellfish off the Palestine coast in the past three years, by the use of dredges and the Petersen Bottom Grab. Professor Haas at Jerusalem has identified some three hundred specimens from there, the overwhelming number being the bi-valved, gilled lamellibranchs. There have been found to be very few kinds of single-shelled or gastropod molluscs on the Palestine coast, and the few that live there are in large numbers. Several of these additions to the fauna of the Holy Land have not previously been recorded on the neighbouring coasts of Egypt and Syria, and their distribution is being studied in relation to the strip of coastal shelf which is much broader in the south than in the north.

Palestine, with its coastal dunes, its arid hills and semi-desert regions of the Negeb and the Dead Sea rift valley offers rich opportunities for the study of reptiles, and the research council of Israel has encouraged a fairly constant review of this section of the fauna. About ninety species are now known from Israel and Jordan, and ten new species have been added for this region since Flower published his classic work on the reptiles of Egypt. A fairly rich collection of reptiles has been concentrated at the Zoological Institute of the University at Jerusalem for study purposes. Nevertheless, the reptiles of the eastern part of the state of Jordan still remain virtually unknown and there is opportunity there to fill in some of the gaps concerning the faunal differences between Iraq and the Levant. It is interesting to note, however, that modern naturalists have been unable to confirm Canon Tristram's claim for the common European slow-worm as an inhabitant of Palestine. They assume it was claimed in confusion for a larger "glass snake," *Pseudopus apoda*, of Galilee. A new species of colubrine cat-snake is *Tarbophis nigriceps*, found south of Amman in Jordan and in the Negeb of southern Israel. Its chief difference from Savigny's cat-snake, a closely related colubrine, is that it does not roll up into a ball when roughly handled. A new species of tropical viper, *Atractaspis engaddensis*, was discovered by Dr. Mendelsohn at the Biblical site of Ein Geddi, beside the Dead Sea. Ein Geddi is a tropical oasis enclave of wild life in the Dead Sea rift, and this isolated species, with no relative kinds nearer than the Sudan, has survived since perhaps warmer times owing to the great heat and humidity of its locality. It has a parallel in certain tropical plants and birds, like the sooty falcon, the babbler and the sociable vulture, which survive in the Dead Sea rift, but not elsewhere in the Holy Land.

From the foot of Jebel Lussan, a desert hill south of Beersheba and on the Sinai border, Mr. J. Wahrman in 1950 collected a new subspecies of the common Agama lizard, of striking red or yellow colour which is retained to such a degree in captivity that it should appeal to amateur



herpetologists who make a hobby of keeping such things. There are now many more reptiles known from Jordan and Israel than from neighbouring Egypt and Turkey—twenty more than in the latter country and fourteen more than in Egypt, a considerable number in view of the small size of the Holy Land. Most of them are Mediterranean types, dwelling on the coastal side of the mountains. In the past, several waves of migration brought species from the east, and later some entered the country from the North African deserts by way of the rift valley of the Arabah and along the Sinai coast. Perhaps the most interesting for the Palestine fauna were those which came from the eastern steppes but were not able to cross the deep rift of the Jordan-Dead Sea depression and sweep on across the whole North African desert belt like the others.

These studies, together with the rich prehistoric finds in the Carmel caves, support the history of the mammalian fauna of the Holy Land as the result of several waves of immigrants from the cooler, damper steppes and the hot southern and eastern deserts. The hyrax, or Biblical coney, which still survives in the Rift Valley near the Dead Sea, is one of the oldest inhabitants of the country.

Before the recent world war, the British excavated important Stone Age remains from the Wady el Mughara cave in the Carmel. Since then M. Stekelis of the Israel Exploration Society has unearthed important animal remains from the Abu Usba cave on Mount Carmel, with American and British grants. This cave is on the northern face of a bluff above Wadi Falah, near the coast at Athlit, and an historic nesting colony of griffon vultures which probably dates from Biblical times as these birds resort annually to the same nesting colonies. The remains of the larger mammals found in the Abu Usba cave, like the wild boar, the fallow deer and the roe deer were undoubtedly hunted and brought there by man. Many of the bats and rodents were probably prehistoric inhabitants of the cave, and Prof. Haas thinks that many were amassed in the form of food-pellets by birds-of-prey and by owls which used the cave. Thus the find represents a collection of animal remains from a large area. Unlike the Wady el Mughara cave, the Abu Usba cave included a very rich collection of bird remains, amongst which Professor Haas has identified bee-eater, goldfinch, chaffinch, greenfinch, great tit, starling, white wagtail, wheatear, bluethroat, lapwing, bulbul, chiffchaff, sedge-warbler and the house-sparrow. The fact that prehistoric hawks and owls used the Abu Usba cave and not the Mughara cave resulted in this rich collection of small mammals and birds, which they brought as prey, and which is absent from the remains unearthed in the latter site.

The botanical discoveries in post-war Palestine have been most important in the realm of the ecology of desert and near-desert plants, and the laws which govern the relation between plants and subterranean water-level changes. All this has economic importance in the efforts to cultivate the semi-desert regions of the Near East which U.N.A. is pursuing from North Africa to Sind. Dr. Hugo Boyko, the Government ecologist and one of the most active field botanists now in Israel, has studied the remains of an ancient laurel forest on Carmel and the influence of sun-radiation in the distribution of plants, like the forest-building *Valonea* oak, in the Holy Land. He has worked on the historic influence



of bedouin grazing in the Negeb desert which produced an unnaturally dominant vegetation of unpalatable shrubs and perennial flowers, like *Artemesia*. Now, by eliminating nomadic grazing by the ubiquitous goat, it is hoped to restore this region to its natural feathergrass steppe, for greater economic use. He has also shown how climatic extremes influenced the distribution of the beautiful *Iris Helenae* (now called *Iris Mariae*) and a probable new species of *Anemone coronaria* type. He has shown how many semi-desert seeds depend upon escaping the sun by lodging in moister burrows of mice, lizards and insects in the sand, before they can germinate. His "geo-ecological law" of plant distribution, which shows a parallel function between the local distribution of plants and their distribution over a larger area, is being applied to land development in these semi-arid regions. He is a member of the UNESCO council on arid zone research and, aided by his wife Dr. Elisabeth Boyko, he made the successful experimental desert garden on Israel's Red Sea shore at Eilat (formerly Um Rash Rash). In his study of the age of trees and the record of local soil erosion by the amount of root-plate exposed on ancient olive and other trees, Dr. Boyko estimates the age of the majestic Christ's thorn tree which Lawrence described in the Wadi Arabah (where he watered his camels at Ein Husb, on his way back to Beersheba), as about 1500 years, old laurel and carob (locust-bean) stumps in the Carmel area as 500 years, the famous olives of Gethsemane as possibly about 3,000 years old, and the oldest of the Cedars of Lebanon at about 4,000 years. Ancient plants are thus being used as climatic indicators in the development of lonely areas. It is the aim of Dr. Y. Gindel, of the forest research station at Rehovot, to replant many of the forests of which the Holy Land was denuded after Biblical times, but not always with the indigenous trees. About thirty tropical and sub-tropical trees have been acclimatised at Rehovot with a view to future sources of cellulose, nitro-cellulose, tannin and etheric oils. Tree-belts are being planted to reduce the effect of desert winds in the Negeb, and to increase air and soil moisture.

ERIC HARDY.

## FLOWERS FROM CLASSIC FIELDS

IT may perhaps seem strange that a visitor to Greece or Italy, who is a lover of their ancient shrines and ruins, should cherish a yet more enduring memory of their wild flowers. But it is pictures of these, associated indeed with their historic setting, that most often flash on the "inward eye" of some of us. Pictures, for instance, of anemones in springtime, their small, pale-mauve blossoms starring the grass under the olives round the walls of Assisi, where St. Francis walked of old, or a field of the large crimson and purple ones (*A. coronaria*) seen by a dusty highway in the Sienese countryside. A village near Bordighera is named Campo Rosso after them. So royal is their colouring that one can well believe them to have been the "lilies of the field" whose glory outrivalled that of Solomon. The Apennine anemone blends its delicate Wedgewood blue with rosy cyclamen and our own primroses in some Italian woods; scillas and grape-hyacinths are found in others, such as those of Vallom-

brosa, "where the Etrurian shades High over-arched embower"—one of Milton's travel memories. Yet another anemone, the *Adonis*, resembles a scarlet ranunculus, with a black centre and feathery leaves. Large, dark-eyed violets among the ruins of Hadrian's Villa at Tivoli are a fragrant memory from a long-past April.

In Greece, the poppies seem a deeper red than ours, and in Crete one recalls a road leading to the legendary marvels of Knossos which was bordered by big opium-poppies (*Papaver somniferum*), white with a purple splash on their petals, mixed with vivid blue borage—the colouring of some Persian tiles. The mound that covers the heroic dead at Marathon is clothed with tufts of asphodel, the flower associated by poets with the Elysian fields; it grows thickly round the golden temples of Sicily. In that lovely island of the Theocritean idylls, almond trees are a drift of white blossoms, each with a faint, central flush—an exquisite foreground for the visionary peak of snow-crowned Etna in the distance. The almond must be white in Palestine too, if the words "the almond tree shall flourish", in the moving description of old age in Ecclesiastes, are correctly interpreted as referring to the white hair of the aged. Returning in thought to Greece, one remembers, among a host of others, the "fair-clustered narcissus," sung of at Colonos by Sophocles; wild gladiolus among the springing corn; dwarf irises; a multi-coloured vetch like a miniature sweet-pea, a blue pimpernel, and bushes of pink cistus, near Eleusis, which at first sight deluded one into thinking them wild roses. Many hillsides of the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts are carpeted by an aromatic growth of shrubs, such as rosemary, lavender and sage; this is the *maquis*, a name now for ever associated with underground resistance movements in the war.

Autumn, needless to say, has its own beauties. In Italy, the tawny leaves of the vine strung from tree to tree or pole to pole; the branches of pomegranate heaped on barges coming in to Venice; the woods of wild "strawberry-tree" (*Arbutus unedo*), bearing its creamy clusters of flowers and glowing fruit, on the steep ascent to the hilltop of Etruscan Volterra, Macaulay's "lordly Volaterrae." Clumps of oleander, deep cherry-coloured, pink or white, edge the little steamer-piers on Como or Maggiore. Any attempted description of the flowers in the villa gardens on the Lakes, or elsewhere—their orange and lemon blossoms, their masses of roses, azaleas or camellias, for example—would read too much like a horticultural catalogue. Such bright memory-pictures do indeed cheer winter days, when our own countryside is bare, or that time of life when "the day is far spent," when, as the Vulgate sums it up in one word, *advesperascit*.

EMMA GURNEY SALTER.

## RUSSIA'S NEW CONSUMER DEAL

**S**HORTLY after Malenkov had reshuffled his all-Soviet ministries, the pudgy new Red Czar summoned leading civil servants and curtly told them that the time had come to switch their bureaucratic machinery back into normal gear. Stalin's personal life rhythm was unusual and it had transformed diplomatic habits in Moscow. He slept well into

the morning and his working day began about mid-day. That meant that ambassadors had to be prepared to be called to the Kremlin at 3 a.m. Malenkov has normalised office routine. The day begins at 9 a.m. and by six in the evening most government buildings are deserted except for their guards. "Pravda" and "Izvestia", the two official Soviet newspapers, are published two hours earlier, and even radio programmes have a new streamlined schedule. Since Malenkov's assumption of office, loaves at bakeries are shoved into the ovens two hours sooner. The bureaucratic apparatus is the vanguard in this return to normalcy. It is followed by the peasantry which is still trying to get a new deal from this government. There have been enough promises from such men as Mikoyan and Khrushchev who, as far as one can tell, are speaking with authority.

Spartan conditions in the consumer goods industry certainly need some relaxing. There is an acute shortage in time-pieces. The U.S.S.R. plans to increase output to 23,000,000 watches and clocks by 1956; metal bed production is to go up to 16,500,000 beds annually (the U.S. produce only 2,100,000 annually); T.V. sets output is to be stepped up to a million pieces (present U.S. production around six million). The need for more bicycles has always been pressing. Production is to rise to 3,800,000 by 1956. Comparing these promises with Germany's re-emergence economically the Soviets are still not doing so well. The average German who lost the war is eating 134 eggs annually; the average Russian who won the war will be eating 52 eggs by 1955. Similarly Fritz is feasting on 80 lb. of meat annually; Ivan will have to be satisfied with 28 lb. of meat. The German's fat consumption has gone up to 26 kilogrammes a year; the Russian will have to be satisfied with 8.6 kilogrammes. The starting shot in this race for more consumer goods was discharged by Malenkov personally last August 8 when he promised the Supreme Soviet a "drastic upsurge in the production of consumer goods". After a respectful time lag Nikita Khrushchev put the blunt question—"what is wrong with our agrarian policy?" The farmers could have told him. Russia possesses 4½ million cows less than in 1916. Her pig stocks have only risen from 23 million to 28.5 million despite the fact that the population have increased from 140 million in 1916 to 215 million. "Butter production in Siberia has dropped from 75,000 tons in 1952 to 65,000 tons", he scowled. The already swollen bureaucratic machinery was further distended by the setting up of additional ministries. Six ministries now control the consumer manufactures: the ministry of food, the ministry for the production of consumer goods, the domestic trade ministry, the foreign trade ministry, the ministry for state farms, and the ministry for agricultural equipment. A very complicated decree was issued shortly afterwards giving statistical enlightenment to those baffled bureaucrats in far-off Baku and Vladivostok who will have to supervise the increase in production. One fact which emerges from this complexity of percentages is the need for 23,000 additional retail shops. These are to be opened by 1956.

Speaking to leading functionaries of domestic and foreign trade organisations Anastasy Mikoyan gave them details of the latest plans on how one could step up the consumer goods productions so as to assuage the

widespread dissatisfaction. "Sixty per cent of the Soviet refrigerator output is to be taken over by the armaments industry", he said. "The aircraft industry will take over 50 per cent. of the production of kitchen utensils by 1955. We aim to put out 64,000 tons of cooking and kitchen utensils by 1955." He made the following points:—

Soviet citizens wishing to have a night out should have the choice of a well-assorted menu. When Russians go out to buy they should see inviting shop windows. We want better window decorations. Luxury goods should be packed and not filled into purchasers' jars. More hygiene in the packing of foodstuffs and especially bread.

He promised the dazed bureaucrats 8.5 milliard roubles to build up this cuckoo cloud industry. Their faces brightened considerably, for Mikoyan had only mentioned more money and not a reduction of the civil service. Russia has some 18 million bureaucrats who could make things very unpleasant for any dictator who decided to reduce their number. Thus the new regime has not ventured to make any experiments on this sector. On the contrary concessions to the bureaucratic caste have had to be made. Quite a number of officers' wives who have returned from Vienna or Berlin, from Leipzig and Budapest, have demanded attractive wares in the shops, better service and a more selective choice of consumer goods. This pressure has increased since the death of Stalin whose hand lay heavily on the cumbersome machinery of government. An official's wife simply is no longer contented with four square metres of flat space per head. She wants to have some elbow room to move about. Besides, she wants to enjoy some of the simpler luxuries of life. The average consumption of butter, for example, per month has been estimated authentically at two ounces. But farmers, although they still possess 15 million cows personally of a total stock of 24 million, want to have a bigger incentive to produce more. That would mean giving farmers a cow each. In other words 40 million cows would have to be owned personally. That task seems virtually impossible today. The short-sighted policy which Stalin pursued is only now becoming obvious to those men who paid lip-service to him so long without being able to think clearly. But if Malenkov has studied the state investment policy of the last three decades, it must have struck him that a government which only invests in agriculture a total of 17 roubles per head of population in a year (3.4 milliard roubles per year from 1925 to 1952) cannot expect very much by way of solid results. The favoured heavy industry received 638 milliard roubles in the same space of time.

The result of this policy has been a turn out of capital goods and a paucity of consumer goods. In fact 70 per cent. of production was concentrated on machinery and other non-consumer manufactures. In most western countries the reverse has been the case. If Malenkov's figures are true, the government has invested a billion roubles in the nation's economy from 1925 to 1952. Of this vast sum light industry received a pitiable 7 per cent. No wonder the Soviet citizen has had cause to grumble. Malenkov knew almost from the start that he would have to cosset the consumer, at least for a while, and he did this by reducing the shop prices of food, thereby reducing the enormous profits made by the state trading and wholesale organisations. This has hardly

touched their solvency. When the Soviets import fish from Scotland at 1s. a kilogramme the same fish is sold at 15s. a lb. The profit is made by the wholesale distributor which is a state body. The government must also raise the purchasing power by making money cheaper. This is being done by cutting down the amount of the forced loan to which Soviet citizens have had to subscribe annually. In other words, by giving the government less by way of loans, consumers can spend the rest in the shops. Reduction of taxes and in the amount of forced loans (the loan is always to the government not by the government) will increase the amount of roubles in Russians' pockets by 50 milliard roubles annually. Yet the government merely plans to increase the size and potentiality of the consumer goods and food industry by 8.5 milliard roubles. This seems incongruous. With one hand Malenkov and colleagues are giving their subjects 50 milliard roubles to spend, and with the other they are keeping a tight check on the growth of the very industry for which this spending money is intended. At the same time Russia is holding fast to its armaments programme, even if Mikoyan has pointed out that a part of the consumer goods industry is to be taken over by munitions plants and aircraft factories. In fact three per cent. of the capital sunk in orthodox armaments production has been diverted to the output of atom and hydrogen bombs. Latest events have shown that the government is not being fair with its people and particularly with the peasants. The additional profits which peasants have lately been permitted to make have been canalised into investments such as better lighting plant and the improvement of farm machinery. Thus if a peasant is at last able to make 100 roubles on the sly, government inspectors tell him to sink it into his barn. This has not made him particularly gratified and he has already recognised the inevitable: that the promising bait that was thrown out during the summer of 1953 is nothing but another lure into the trap from which there is no escape.

K. FRANK FELDMAN.

## PREFACES IN NOVELS

**P**REFACES occupy a large place in the history of English Literature. In Victorian times and even earlier, many writers penned long introductions to their novels. These Prefaces are useful because they supply the reader with background information about the books. This is especially the case with Sir Walter Scott who could be called "The Master of Prefaces" so much was he addicted to them, even to the point of overburdening his novels with introductions. Yet these are invaluable to the student of literature. Generally it is unwise to neglect an introduction, it is unfair to the author and the reader himself is likely to miss much of the meaning behind the story and the author's reason for writing it. In his General Preface to the Waverley novels Sir Walter Scott describes how he came to write his first Romance, the opening chapters of which lay neglected for so long in an old desk. Scott says: "I felt that something might be attempted for my own country, of the same kind with that which Miss Edgeworth so fortunately achieved for Ireland—something



which might introduce her motives to those of the sister kingdom, in a more favourable light than they had been placed hitherto, and tend to procure sympathy for their virtues and indulgences for their foibles . . .". He continues: "And here I frankly confess that the mode in which I conducted the story scarcely deserved the success which the Romance afterwards attained. The tale of *Waverley* was put together with so little care, that I cannot boast of having sketched any distinct plan for the work." *Waverley's* Introduction gives an account of the incidents on which the book was founded. The events were still within living memory of Scott's own people and acquaintances, just as in the Preface to *The Trumpet Major* Thomas Hardy states: "The external incidents which direct its course are mostly an unexaggerated reproduction of the recollections of old persons, well-known to the author in childhood, but now long dead, who were eye-witnesses of those scenes."

But Sir Walter did not often deal with such recent events. In his Introduction to *The Abbot* he explains why he was such a prolific novelist: "I looked round my library and could not but observe that from the time of Chaucer to that of Byron, the most popular authors had been the most prolific. . . . Looking more attentively at the patriarchs of literature, whose career was as long as it was brilliant, I thought I perceived that in the busy prolonged course of exertion there were no doubt occasional failures, but still those who were favourites of their age triumphed over these . . .". This reminds the reader that *The Abbot* was the book with which, after the comparatively poor reception afforded to *The Monastery* Sir Walter hoped to make his "comeback." And as he frankly confesses he chose Mary, Queen of Scots as the central character because he knew that a great historical figure always creates interest. He says: ". . . it was with these feelings of hope and apprehension that I ventured to awaken in a work of fiction the memory of Queen Mary, so interesting by her wit, her beauty, her misfortune and the mystery which still does and perhaps always will, overhang her history." Scott owed a great deal to ancient chronicles, but he never failed to acknowledge his debt. In January, 1829, after revising some of the *Waverley* novels he wrote: "The General Preface to the new Edition and the Introductory Notices to each separate work, will contain an account of such circumstances attending the first publication of the Novels and Tales, as may appear interesting in themselves, or proper to be communicated to the public. The Author also proposes to publish, on this occasion, the various legends, family traditions, of obscure historical facts, which have formed the groundwork of these novels, and to give some account of the places where the scenes are laid, when these are altogether, or in part, real, as well as a statement of particular incidents founded on fact . . .".

Scott's example, though in a lesser degree and with much less weighty introductions has often been followed by our Historical novelists. Margaret Irwin in her Preface to *The Stranger Prince* explains how she came across many of her authentic details, about the principal characters, among old manuscripts. And in his Preface to the Original Edition of *The Tower of London* Harrison Ainsworth explains: "It has been, for years, the cherished wish of the writer of the following pages to make the Tower of London . . . the groundwork of a romance . . .". At that time little of



the Tower was shown to the public and Ainsworth hoped that his book would help to recreate interest in the ancient fortress. He goes on to say: "But it is the hope of the writer, that the day is not far off, when all that is really worth seeing will be accessible. In this view, the present publication may not be without use."

Prefaces often give interesting information about the old customs of the countryside. Such a one is Thomas Hardy's Introduction to *Under the Greenwood Tree*. He says: "The state of the Mellstock Quire and its old established west-gallery musicians, . . . is intended to be a true picture, at first hand, of the persons, ways and customs which were common in the village of fifty or sixty years ago." . . . "The zest of these bygone instrumentalists must have been keen and staying, to take them as it did, on foot every Sunday, after toiling all week through all weathers to church, which often lay at a distance from their homes." They had their own musical scores to copy out and as Hardy reminds the reader, they received so little in payment, about ten shillings a year, that their efforts were really a labour of love.

But not everything was pleasantly pastoral during Victorian times. The age of Victorian literature was often one of reform as so many Prefaces to novels remind us. Then it was often proved that the pen was mightier than the sword. Charles Kingsley in his Preface to the fourth edition of *Yeast* could comment on how many improvements had taken place in country life since his novel first appeared. And Charles Dickens's novels often pointed out wrongs that needed righting. When *Nicholas Nickleby* was first published in volume form, in 1839, Dickens wrote in his Preface: "It has afforded the Author great amusement and satisfaction during the progress of this work, to learn from country friends and from a variety of ludicrous statements concerning himself in provincial newspapers, that more than one Yorkshire schoolmaster lays claim to being the original Mr. Squeers. One worthy he has reason to believe has actually consulted with the law, as to his having good grounds on which to rest an action for libel; another he meditates a journey to London, for the express purpose of committing an assault and battery upon his traducer, a third person remembers being waited on 1st January twelve months, by two gentlemen, one of whom held him in conversation while the other took his likeness: and although Mr. Squeers has but one eye and he has two and the published sketch does not resemble him (whoever he may be) in any respect, still he and his friends and neighbours know at once for whom it is meant, because the character is so like him."

Although Dickens dissembles a little in the above Preface he is more frank in another which he wrote for the same book. In this he acknowledges travelling to Yorkshire and taking with him some letters of introduction to schoolmasters there. An earlier novelist, who was concerned with education in one of his books was Daniel Defoe, who in his *Colonel Jack* tried to point out some of the consequences of poor education. In his Preface he comments: "Here is room for just and copious observations on the blessings and advantages of a sober and well-governed education, and the ruin of so many thousands of all ranks in this nation for the want of it; here also we may see how much public schools and charities might be improved, to prevent the destruction of so many unhappy children. . . .

The book was a protest against the neglect of the education and training of the poorer people in the author's day.

Not long afterwards Oliver Goldsmith was penning his Preface to *The Vicar of Wakefield*. He was concerned not with reforms or customs, but in depicting a good man in a variety of circumstances. He observes: "There are a hundred faults in this thing and a hundred things might be said to prove them beauties; but it is needless. A book may be amusing with numerous errors, or it may be very dull without a single absurdity. The hero of this piece writes in himself the three greatest characters upon earth; he is a priest, a husbandman and the father of a family. He is drawn as ready to teach and ready to obey, as simple in affluence and majestic in adversity."

In contrast Thackeray prefers to assume the character of showman in his Preface to *Vanity Fair*. He says: "As the Manager of the Performance sits before the curtain on the boards and looks into the Fair, a feeling of profound melancholy comes over him in his survey of the bustling place. . . . I have no other moral than this tag to the present story of *Vanity Fair*. Some people consider fairs immoral altogether, and aschew such, with their servants and families: very likely they are right. But persons who think otherwise, and are of a lazy, or a benevolent, or a sarcastic mood, may perhaps like to step in for half-an-hour, and look at the performance . . .". "What more has the Manager of the Performance to say? To acknowledge the kindness with which it has been received in all the principal towns of England through which the show has passed, and where it has been most favourably noticed by the respected conductors of the public Press, and by the Nobility and Gentry. He is proud to think that his Puppets have given satisfaction to the very best company in this empire."

Charlotte Brontë in her Preface to the second edition of *Jane Eyre* also thanks the critics, public and publishers for their good reception of her book. But she does not forget the few discordant voices raised against it and reminds her readers that "Conventionality is not morality. Self-righteousness is not religion. To attack the first is not to assail the last. To pluck the mask from the face of the Pharisee, is not to lift an impious hand to the Crown of Thorns. These things and deeds are diametrically opposed; they are as distinct as is vice from virtue. Men too often confound them; they should not be confounded; appearances should not be mistaken for truth; narrow human doctrines, that only tend to elate and magnify a few should not be substituted for the world redeeming creed of Christ." She goes on to extend her point and shows her great familiarity with The Bible. From such a Preface the reader can learn much about the author's own character. Just as in other authors' Introductions, the reflections on methods of work can be described as "helpful hints" to less experienced writers.

Whatever the reasons for the book, only the author can explain how a certain theme, a certain incident or a person came to grip his imagination and almost compel him to create a story around them. Arnold Bennett's interesting and illuminating Preface to *The Old Wives Tale* is a good example of this. He relates how in 1903 he noticed a grotesque old woman in a Paris restaurant and how he was struck with the fact that "the change

from the young girl to the stout ageing woman is made up of an infinite number of infinitesimal changes, each unperceived by her, only intensifies the pathos. It was at this instant that I was visited with the idea of writing the book which ultimately became *The Old Wives Tale*." He goes on to state that the woman in the restaurant was too old and unsympathetic a type on which to base his heroine. But she did act as the germ of an idea for his novel.

It is only in historical novels that lengthy prefaces are found nowadays. Generally a page is as much Introduction as the author gives to his work. There are exceptions of course. The short prefaces can be accounted for in two or three ways. In these days of heavy taxation few authors can spare the time to write lengthy introductions to their books. The paper shortage, especially during the war was another factor which led to the curtailment of long introductions. But the principal cause is surely the law of libel. Most authors have to be content with a brief, preface bleakly stating that: "The characters and incidents in this story are entirely imaginary and have no relation to any person either living or dead." Even Hardy in his fine prefaces had to ask his readers to remember that there was no such county as his Victorian Wessex, outside his novels. When a writer pens his own Preface he is apt to assume a somewhat apologetic tone. But a popular type of Introduction nowadays is that written by a competent critic assessing the author's work and telling something of his life. Naturally this leaves out the apologetic tone instead it really introduces the reader to the merits of the book. Many of these introductory essays explain some hidden motives and enable the reader to bring to the book both insight and imagination. But whether the Introduction is written by the author or some other person, it serves a great purpose in helping the reader to really understand the book.

MARION TROUGHTON.

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

### BULGARIAN PORTENT?

**A**T FIRST sight there seems to be ground at least for speculation about a possible break in the post-Stalin attitude of the Kremlin to organised Christianity. The break may be either tactical and temporary (a dangerous experiment from the Russian point of view) or may be a more permanent acknowledgment of defeat, or of doubt and suspense, in that particular field of communist aggression. The evidence upon which the speculation may be based is well summarised in the January number of the Chatham House Review, *The World Today* (pp. 36-38), its main substance being constituted by the election of a Patriarch for the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Why did Chervenkov allow such a thing? Was he trying to pose as a friend of the Church in a manoeuvre such as was unsuccessfully tried in Poland several years ago, in order to bring the Church to heel? Or was he merely seeking friends to buttress his personal position and prestige?

Let it be remembered that when he succeeded Dimitrov some four years ago as head of the State (his rival Kostov having been liquidated by hanging as a traitor) it was generally assumed that it was Stalin himself who in effect had appointed him to the post; and Chervenkov gave apparent substance to that surmise by becoming more Stalinist than Stalin, whom he regularly propagated as his leader and teacher. After Stalin's death Chervenkov became a ship without a rudder, a slave without a master, a follower without a leader. His embarrassment was illustrated in a sudden dilution of his personal pre-eminence in the party and his eager adoption of the Kremlin's new ideology of "collective leadership" in which the party, not the man, became, at least ostensibly, the operative agency. He watered down, in the name of the party, some of his own former decrees of an oppressive character and in particular loosened his stranglehold over the Church.

At the beginning of May last year the National Congress of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was allowed to meet in the Palace of the Holy Synod in Sofia to elect a Patriarch. There had been no Patriarch for more than 500 years. Nor could the argument be easily sustained that, as was the case in the war-time election of a Patriarch in Moscow, this new Patriarch in Sofia was to be a mere tool of the Kremlin. On the contrary the new Patriarch, Cyril, thus elected, was known to be anti-Communist in his views. In other words he was known to be a true Christian. When the communists overran Bulgaria in 1944 he was imprisoned and thus cut off from his diocese of Plovdiv, of which he was titular Bishop. In 1953, by contrast, he was allowed to stand as one of three candidates for the revived Patriarchate, and was duly elected by a large majority of votes. The interesting thing is not only that a well-known anti-communist religious leader was elected as the head of the Church, or that the constituent members of the Congress were thus proved to be free of coercion or fear, so far as the head of the State was concerned, but that as a result of the manifest change in Chervenkov's attitude to religion there now operates in Bulgaria an Orthodox Church led by a Christian, an anti-Communist (which in this case is the same thing), a well known historian, and one who is steeped in the Christian tradition as operative in the West, namely in France, Austria, Germany and pre-Tito Yugoslavia. He was educated in Paris, Vienna, Berlin and Zagreb.

The satisfactory thing is that there is no reason to doubt the good faith of the new Patriarch, and that therefore it seems to be established that the communist policy, hitherto consistently and relentlessly pursued, of suppressing Christianity has been suspended in the case of one satellite country. Wedges have a thick as well as a thin end. It should not be forgotten, however, that the communist strategy is essentially aimed against Christianity, because Christ and anti-Christ obviously cannot be reconciled, and that therefore the possibility must always be borne in mind of a future reversion in Bulgaria to the religious persecution which still is practised, to a foul and thorough degree, in every other communist country. But even if the Cyril episode prove to be nothing more than a flash in the pan, reflecting the sort of hesitancy which seems to have characterised the post-Stalin Kremlin in other ways, yet the free flow of Christian practice may constitute, and indeed is likely to constitute, a

bastion of defence against communist inroads which a future Chervenkov may find impregnable.

It seems relevant therefore to recall whether the Bulgarian relaxation of oppression applies to other than the religious sphere. The answer seems to be, yes; but it seems not yet possible to judge whether that answer results from an imposed necessity, or from a change in policy. There is no doubt, for instance, that the drastic process of subjecting a mainly peasant country of small-holders to a highly industrialised economy in the towns and an extensively collectivised agriculture in the country has not been achieved without incidental discomfort and distress to the population as a whole. It is at least possible therefore that Chervenkov's recent "concessions" to the peasants—the remission of debts due to the Government for taxes, fines, fees of various kinds, equipment and machinery, for instance—may be his belated tribute to an obstinate fact, namely, that when debts are plainly unpayable, they cannot be paid. We had the like sort of experience when, after the first world war, certain war debts that had been imposed upon Germany were progressively remitted. There are certain basic truths in life which neither victors in war nor communist tyrants can deny. One is that whatever power you may possess you cannot extract money from empty pockets.

In one respect however there does seem to have been an unmistakably conciliatory process at work in Chervenkov's mind. After Stalin's death he stopped talking in his reviews of foreign policy about the warmongering spies, assassins and whatnot that according to his former utterances constituted the exclusive inhabitants of his neighbouring non-communist countries, Turkey and Greece, or the recusant cominform country, Yugoslavia. He now protested a desire to reach a friendly understanding with those countries, submitting in one of his statements that there were no problems outstanding with them that could not be solved by what he called "peaceful negotiations", and in general subscribing to the ideal of what he called "peace and co-operation between the nations". He went so far as to declare his readiness "to resume diplomatic relations with the United States"—those relations which had been broken off four years ago. The resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States being presumably as hard a test of goodwill as any satellite country could undergo, it is not perhaps surprising that Chervenkov has even subscribed to (in his own words) "the noble aim of relaxing international tension". The clue to the genuineness of such sentiments, as of communist pretensions in general at this time, is to be found in the future attitude of communist rulers, in Bulgaria and elsewhere, to religion.

#### THE MORAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

What they have been trying to do in Berlin is to reach a compromise between one conception of political life and another without relevance to moral chasm that divides them. Moral? There will no doubt be some raising of eyebrows, some supercilious surprise, as it were, at the notion that the moral law can have any competence in international affairs. What has God to do with diplomacy? once asked a distinguished and innocent ambassador, the representative of a European Christian country.



What is true is that, obviously, the wider the circle of human contacts, the weaker becomes that spiritual momentum which starts in the individual human soul. As the circle caused by the dropping of a stone in a pond becomes weaker as it spreads outwards, so the central goodness of the human make-up tends to be diluted as it spreads over collective human enterprise and organisation. There is indeed hardly any need to illustrate so well-known a fact. The sort of bickering and scoring of points that goes on in the exchanges between national governments at this time, the low level of feeling and of purpose that characterises the normal procedure of high diplomacy, are such that the majority of human beings, including the diplomats themselves, would be incapable of sinking so low in their individual private affairs.

There is need for instance of a diplomatic conference—at the “highest” level or thereabouts as the ironic jargon goes—to settle a specific problem, whether in Europe or in Korea. A proposal is made that such a conference be held. There follows a sort of preliminary conference on the question whether the substantive conference can in fact be held, and where, and how. In the case of the Four-Power Berlin conference which is being held as these lines are written, a series of ponderous and formidable preliminary vendettas had first to be fought out. The Western Powers proposed that the conference should take place on January 4th. Russia (of course and as a matter of habitual contrariness) proposed that it should take place on January 25th or later. Where should it take place? In Berlin, of course; but where exactly in Berlin? The last thing that Russia would accept was that it should take place in western Berlin; for such a thing would mortally wound Russian national pride. In eastern Berlin, then? No, the Western Powers could not allow Russia thus to score an important victory in the battle of prestige. In both sectors, then, in turn? Obviously. Despite the inconvenience of holding a conference under the stipulated condition that the delegates, their staffs and documents should constantly flit from one part of Berlin to another—merely to hold the scales in a matter of petty pride and prestige—no other solution was regarded as possible. But that solution involved an incidental embarrassment. It might be necessary for the western delegates, during one of the sessions in eastern Berlin, to get into touch quickly with their headquarters in western Berlin, or vice versa; and since the summer of 1952, in accordance with Russia’s normal pin-pricking procedure, telephone connection between the two sectors had been cut. That particular problem of high diplomacy was easily solved.

But there was another silly problem to be disposed of. There were four Powers involved. Three of them, the Western three, had their headquarters in the one part of the city, one of them, Russia, in the other. Another battle of prestige became inevitable. It was elementary to western prestige that the flit should be from one national headquarters to another, the changes thus being rung between four different sets of conference room. But no! Russian prestige demanded that the alternation be between east and west, the west being thus regarded as a unit, and the practical mathematical result (important to subsequent Russian pride and propaganda) being that three sessions of the conference would be held in Russian headquarters to every one session in United States headquarters.



Such is the stuff of high diplomacy. There has indeed been some deterioration in this respect in the already poor quality of diplomatic practice. A new low level has been touched in the contemporary performances. Even up to 1939 it was customary to hold conferences for a specific purpose. Even if they did not succeed, such conferences were held, simply and straightforwardly. By contrast today most of the business of high diplomacy has dropped to the level of argument about whether conferences can or cannot be held at all. In the second week of January this year, for instance, we were given the remarkable news that the communists in Korea had agreed to hold a conference to decide whether a conference could be arranged of which the purpose would be to decide whether the Korean political conference, adumbrated in principle months earlier, could be held! This is how Reuter put it (*Times*, January 14th last) in a message from Seoul: "The Communists have agreed that liaison secretaries should meet tomorrow to discuss a resumption of talks to arrange a Korean peace conference". That information had been given by Mr. Young, American State Department negotiator. In the very next column of the *Times* which carried that typical piece of news—typical of our contemporary experience—there appeared, from Berlin, the equally typical news that "the discussions between the High Commissioners' representatives on technical arrangements for the Foreign Ministers' conference appear to have ended in complete deadlock". It becomes ever harder for people of ordinary imagination to follow these complicated steps downwards and backwards into the depths of "high" diplomacy.

If the business of international relationships be thus conducted on a level and in a spirit that fall short, far short, even of commonsense and elementary reason, and that deny even the tentative inroad of elementary decency, how, it may be asked, can any realistically-minded person have the assurance, or the lack of a sense of humour, to talk about the moral law in international affairs? The answer is this, that however consistently you may ignore the moral law, however fast you may plunge ahead in complete disregard of the moral law, that law none the less continues to operate. It comes back at you. It pulls you up, soon or late. In our time, in the hectic experience of the first half of the twentieth century, it is possible to detect, belatedly it is true, but inexorably, that the moral law is loaded, as it were, omnipotently to come out on top. The word "inexorable" seems to describe the process. The process becomes palpable to one's eyes only in the retrospect. When you are climbing a mountain, you often do not know what progress you make, if any; when you look back from the top you see the clear path of the progress you made.

In 1914 a clear challenge was thrown out to the moral law. No one at that time could have foreseen, even if he was in the least interested in the question, what the answer would be, or how it would come. Need it be said that the cause of good relations between the nations is not served, but is diametrically wrecked, when the nations go to war with one other? To measure the truth of such a statement it is necessary to be grim in an elemental degree. Foreign affairs are very foreign to reason and to intelligence. At the beginning of this century the British Empire could see the sun day and night. It was well in the sun, in every sense.

Germany coveted a place in that same sun—the sun in its profusion being adequate to that ambition. High diplomacy, however, as we have had a cumulative evidence to know, seems to be capable of encompassing gigantic disasters on the promptings of petty jealousy and blinded self-interest. "Petty" seems to be the fair word, because it needs a quite small advance in the development of intelligence to grasp the fact that prosperity is indivisible, and that one man's or one nation's success automatically leads to another's benefit. Jealousy and greed, however, in 1914 made those two leading nations, in the spirit of the Kilkenny cats or of Aesop's dog, to let go the substance of mutual service and instead go to war. Now the moral law includes commonsense in its substance. To violate the one is to violate the other. In this particular case it happened that the devil—whose job it is, among other objects, to make things more difficult for the humankind and thus by the resultant exercise to develop our intelligence—made a particularly savage aggression upon the province of human welfare. The vast and sudden advance in scientific knowledge put into the devil's hands a weapon which he merely handed on to his human dupes.

How sudden was that advance in knowledge can be measured from the dates involved: the internal combustion engine, which made aeroplanes possible, 1820; nitroglycerine, which made bombs possible, 1867; the organisation of air forces 1914-1918; the substitution of the split atom for nitroglycerine as the explosive agent and the dropping of the first atomic bomb, 1945. Almost within a century science gave to the devil, and the devil passed on to man, the means of man's own destruction. Now in 1914, if the moral law had had any effect in Anglo-German relations, it would have been obvious to the two governments that their interests coincided, and that the only instrument available to them for serving those interests was mutual love. The alternatives were of a staggering simplicity and connotation. The moral law being ignored, the two nations chose war, or mutual disservice, instead of love, or mutual service. Thereby the world as a whole—for the scientific advance aforesaid was such that the whole world became promptly involved in the disturbance—plunged into a way of life which still canalises international relationships. The last half century has been a consistent continuing manifestation of what happens when wrong motives are at work. But God, the essence of love, which propounds the moral law, also propounds the merciful corrective to an erring human race. How could there be an omnipotent love without mercy?

The process of the mercy inherent in the moral law, as it affects human relationships in the wide international scope, can be readily detected if one looks back over the past half century. The parting of the ways that took place in 1914 had two complementary results. It was not merely that the way of the moral law was not taken. The negative fact implied a positive, namely that the alternative way was taken, the way namely of what we call materialism as the motive of human conduct. Life is both materialist and spiritual, but the spiritual essence is the ruling factor. If the spiritual element be suppressed, the materialist motive can lead only to disaster. But let the merciful process aforesaid be observed as it operates. Logic in human affairs must take its course, but in the end it gives way to

a higher force. Logic ordained in 1914 that the materialism then unleashed would run its course. Neither a Lenin nor a Hitler was at that time known to politics as a practical force. But the materialist force set in motion—by England and Germany—logically and inevitably enrolled such materialists in its course. Indeed the war begun in 1914 gave the first named of those two materialists his prompt opportunity, and by 1917 he had carried through a bolshevik revolution in Russia, the beginning of a spreading revolution throughout the world which was ideologically based upon the denial of the moral law and therefore a denial of God. Hitler was a passing materialist in the calvalcade. He of course was anti-Christian, and at one time told his traditionally Christian country that it could not now escape the choice between Christ and himself.

After the second world war—the inevitable prolongation of the first—Stalin from the Kremlin directed the spread of the atheist empire. Yet materialism and atheism, being a crippled force because bereft of spiritual guidance, were bound to encompass their own downfall. Such is the effect of the moral law, as it were in reverse. It happened that those countries which, despite 1914 and all that, retained their atavistic sense of dependance upon God, numbed as it was by their prevailing folly, were able at their leisure to observe the coincidence of an atheist ideology with an inhuman slavery never before equalled in history. At this point logic, irony and nemesis combined forces to produce something like a miracle. The western countries, finding themselves menaced by the atheist horde, and being forced to witness the consistent strategy whereby the enemy invariably attempted to destroy the Christian Church in the countries he succeeded in overrunning, were caught up in a combined role of self-defence and defence of Christianity. They of a Christian derivation who in 1914 forgot their Christianity and its moral law were now forced to champion the very Christianity they by their conduct had betrayed. They had gone to war, which was as practical a denial of Christianity as anything that subsequently emanated from the Kremlin. It was they who started the un-christian species of political activity which now threatened to engulf themselves.

The miracle is only half complete. It is impossible as yet to discern much conscious "conversion" in the West to the reality of the Christian faith on which the West was reared and by which the West will be saved. It is as yet a sort of half-baked mentality that sways the western politician. The mercy of God, which as it were supernaturalises the moral law, has made those politicians will-nilly take up their position as defenders (incidentally) of the Christian Church; but they have not yet fully woken up from the anaesthetic. They go to Berlin filled with the muddled notion that they can fix up a compromise between east and west over essential matters. They cannot.

This present century has pointed the issue between two ways of life in our political civilisation. The only possible outcome is of a dual character. On the one side the "Christian" west will recapture its Christianity, forced thereto by the mysterious working of the moral law through the events of our time. On the other side the Russian rulers will reject their present materialist delusions and will themselves revert to their Christian tradition. In the due time east and west will meet, not

on the empty compromises of a Berlin conference, but on the substantial ground of chastened agreement, the approach of which will first be signposted by the calling off by Russia of her dogs of religious persecution—as perhaps foreshadowed in Bulgaria—and by a reborn western consciousness of the Christian content of our civilisation.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

February 11th, 1954.

## LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

### AMERICAN POLICY, 1940-1941

It would be sufficient praise of *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941* to say that it fulfils the promise of its predecessor, but indeed it surpasses that very satisfying work in some respects. The negative role of the United States Government in world diplomacy in 1938 and 1939 deprived the first volume of a central theme; the new work has a magnificent and ready made theme of which the authors, with their mastery of the source material and shrewd objectivity, have made excellent use. Here is the story of the transition of the American people from an equivocal isolationism through the illogicalities of "all aid short of war" to "the tortured emergence of the United States of America as leaders of the forces of light": the story in 941 pages of American foreign relations from Dunkirk to Pearl Harbour. It is lavishly documented from unpublished sources in the Department of State, and its generous scale has allowed the authors to buttress the main narrative with full studies of wartime diplomacy in Berlin, Moscow, Tokyo, and Rome. But the main thread is always the gradual conversion of the President, his advisers and opponents, and in the end the American people to the view that the United States could not find security in leaving others to do the fighting.

Until the end of 1940 United States policy was more generous in advice and exhortation than in practical help. The British Government welcomed the destroyer-bases deal, the continued American goodwill, and the supplies for which it had, however, to pay, from factories which it had also, in large measure, to finance; but it still seemed doubtful whether the Americans had the ability or the understanding to offer more. In the summer of 1940 Washington was "disgusted by the yielding attitude of the British towards Japan," but would not undertake to support the British and Netherlands Governments if a more resistant attitude led to war. The "miracle of Greek resistance" to Italy caused boundless enthusiasm in the States in December; carried away by the excitement President Roosevelt promised the King of Greece material assistance, and peremptorily ordered his harassed advisers to send immediately 30 of the new P-40 pursuit planes. But no such planes were available; and the tragicomedy of aid to Greece followed the sorry spectacle of Congressional bungling of the loan to Finland earlier in the year. The strangest decision was to refuse the British access to any facilities in the bases on British territory recently leased from Great Britain herself.

The authors recognise the force of many of the criticisms of this phase of Roosevelt's policy, and do not appear to be wholly convinced by references to the state of American opinion. There follows an admirable account of the

campaign for Lend-Lease—perhaps the most absorbing section of the volume—and we then settle down to the long story of American negotiations and relations with Japan down to Pearl Harbour. This exhaustive account is in line with Herbert Feis' conclusions in his elegant, but briefer, study, *The Road to Pearl Harbour*; it supplies a weighty corrective to the strange interpretations of the Beard-Tansill school, although the authors had apparently finished writing before Tansill's book, also based on the State Department papers, appeared. Some problems it is true—the alleged promise of American armed support to the British in Malaya a day or two before Pearl Harbour is an example—remain unsolved. But the Beard-Tansill thesis of provocation is rejected; the authors are content to say that only the Japanese attack "resolved the dilemma which consistently plagued the Roosevelt Administration in its efforts to reconcile the demands of national security with the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the Congress, and public opinion."

One fair criticism of the book is that the authors do not show quite sufficient interest in many problems of an economic or administrative character; these were, however, major issues of foreign policy in the circumstances of the times. The vast political and economic implications of the purchasing programme in Latin America on which the United States embarked in 1941 are not brought out in the somewhat bald and brief reference on page 594. The squabble with the Government of Panama in 1941 is, on the other hand, given several pages; more surely than it deserves. The extent of the British offer to the Soviet Government in October 1940 is greatly exaggerated. The references to British hesitations over the Murphy-Weygand agreement of February, 1941 and the sending of supplies to French North Africa follow the exasperated tone of State Department officials on this controversial issue; they do not explain that the policy was challenged by many other American officials, and that the British were justifiably alarmed at the danger of a serious leak in the blockade. All in all, however, this is a brilliant, sane, and thoroughly readable book, which outstrips all previous studies of America's wartime foreign policy.

PROFESSOR W. N. MEDLICOTT.

*Undeclared War, 1940-1941.* By William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason. New York, Harpers, Oxford University Press. 60s.

## \*MARSHAL MANNERHEIM

Finland's Grand Old Man has described his eventful career in a volume of 500 pages which deserves to be read far beyond the frontiers of his gallant little country. Englishmen have always admired the hardy northerners who prefer death to subjection, and who have shown their prowess in the arts of peace as well as war. The names of Sibelius and Mannerheim are familiar to all the world. Both are of Swedish descent, but Finnish patriotism known nothing of racial and linguistic differences.

Entering the Russian army at the close of the last century when Finland was still a province of Russia, Mannerheim learned to know the weakness of the mighty Empire which in later years he was destined to meet in mortal combat. His narrative of the First World War confirms the familiar picture of military unpreparedness, inefficient leadership, and mounting discontent. Witte had warned the Tsar that Russia could not face a struggle with the Central Powers and foretold that it would end not only with catastrophic defeat but with the overthrow of the dynasty. Never was a grim prophecy more accurately fulfilled. "The morale in St. Petersburg was very low," testifies the author in describing the winter of 1916-1917. "Not only the Government but the Tsar was openly criticised. People were war-weary, there was economic chaos and



transport was breaking down." The revolution of 1917, vividly described in these pages, was no surprise. The feeble Tsar and the half-crazy Tsarina had dug their own grave. Even after the collapse of the Empire the author believes that resolute leadership could have saved Russia from the Bolshevik yoke, but no superman was available. Krenski, who could talk but not act, is described as Russia's grave-digger, smoothing the way by his tragic insufficiency for Lenin's coup in November.

The fall of the Tsardom should have meant the peaceful establishment of Finnish independence, but the Bolshevik germ had drifted across the frontier, and Finland found herself in the throes of civil war. It was at this moment that the name of Mannerheim became known to the world as the Commander-in-Chief who helped to save his country from becoming a satellite of the Kremlin. When the Finnish Government accepted aid from Berlin he left the country, but after the collapse of Germany in November 1918 he returned as Regent. For the next twenty years his main task was to prepare to meet an attack—either from Germany or Russia—which he regarded as only too probable. His work was not in vain, for when the dropping of Russian bombs on Helsinki on November, 30, 1939, opened a new conflict, Finland's heroic fight aroused the admiration of the world. The full account of the terrible defensive campaign during the winter of 1939-1940 under the author's leadership forms the most dramatic portion of the book. The Russians themselves were amazed at the vigour of the resistance, and troops in overwhelming strength had to be poured in. Several states sent token aid, and more substantial assistance was expected when the whole outlook was changed by the launching of Hitler's onslaught against the West. For the moment the Finns had to accept such terms as Russia imposed, but their spirit was unbroken. "They can look back with pride on the Winter War and find courage and confidence in its glorious history. That an army so inferior in numbers and equipment should have inflicted such serious defeats on an overwhelmingly powerful enemy is almost without parallel in the history of war. It is equally admirable that the Finnish people, faced with an apparently hopeless situation, were able to resist a feeling of despair. Such a nation has earned the right to live."

When Hitler attacked Russia in 1941 Finland re-entered the conflict, accepting German aid as the only available means of throwing off the Russian stranglehold. She had no more desire to become the stooge of Berlin than of Moscow, and the former danger ended with the German collapse. Russian domination remains, but the Finns enjoy a measure of internal self-determination which removes them from the melancholy category of satellites. The price they have to pay for this privilege is abstention from independent action in the field of foreign affairs. The author closes with a solemn appeal to his countrymen to maintain a united front. "Disunity makes deeper wounds than the enemy's sword. That the Finnish nation did not fail in the hour of trial shows it to be sound at the core."

G. P. GOOCH.

\**Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim*. Translated by Count Eric Lewenhaupt. Cassell. 42s.

## MEN OF DESTINY

H. C. O'Neill is perhaps best known to the public as "Strategicus," the name under which he contributed for example his illuminating weekly military reviews to *The Spectator* during the War. *Men of Destiny*, the final publication of the author, who died recently, studies the four main figures of the last war, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin and Hitler. The book is well-written, at times

brilliant, but unfortunately it does not live up to the promise of its introductory chapter. In this he examines the theory put forward by Arthur Mann, the former editor of *The Yorkshire Post*, that Churchill's rejection by the electorate in 1945 was due to a "revulsion of feeling against the men who were in power before the war, and a growing consciousness of the need for ordinary men and women to play a more important part in the conduct of affairs if the repetition of the tragedy is to be avoided." The author explains that in choosing subjects for his portraits he has taken two—Churchill and Roosevelt—who belonged to the privileged class, and two—Stalin and Hitler—who came from the mass of "ordinary men and women." He rightly points out that it was Hitler and Stalin, who started as "common men," who helped to bring about the war. But so much is obvious. Unfortunately, however, the author does not follow up his interesting speculations as to whether there is a "mind in events" and as to the deeper origins of war and the interplay of events and personalities. The book would have formed a more organic whole if there had been at the end a summary of the conclusions to be drawn from the individual studies.

The pen portraits are gripping and full of freshness. The author shows much artistic skill in building up his figures. His technique is to devote the greater part of each study to roots and origins, to the neglect of the period of power. In the Churchill study, for instance—except for an introductory passage—it is only half-way through that he reaches the Hitlerian period. He also does his best to underline the lesser known and probably less important episodes of each life. The most impressive essay is the one on Roosevelt which does not lack a certain dramatic element. The author brings out well his magnificent achievement in fighting his illness and staging an unprecedented come-back. But his weaknesses are not suppressed. His strange pro-Russian sentiments and his suspicion of British "colonialism" in the later stages of the war are mercilessly exposed, as well as his tendency to megalomania at the end.

Churchill is clearly the author's favourite. The study of this colourful personality, in all its aspects, is warmed by sympathy. We are taken through all the familiar episodes, from the capture in the Boer War, through Churchill's varied experiences in the first world war, to the Admiralty signal in 1939 "Winston is back," and the decisive war premiership, to the rejection by the nation in 1945, and finally the triumphant return to power in 1951. But the author allows us to catch glimpses of stages in the development which we might easily have forgotten in comparison with these brilliant services—the radical beginnings in 1905, the insistence on rigid economy in the services before 1914, his looking upon "the Labour-Socialist Party as little better than the Bolshevik" in the early twenties, his support for King Edward VIII in 1936. Perhaps these phases which fit in so little with the Churchill we know and love as the great national leader in war and peace should be recalled, not merely in the interest of objectivity, but because they throw his greatness into relief, a greatness which was able to overcome inconsistencies and disasters which would have wrecked lesser men. The Stalin portrait brings out clearly the methods the Soviet leader used to get rid of his rivals. The author tries to grapple with the basic theme which he had set himself in the introduction. In an attempt to understand the dictator's ruthless disregard of the value of human lives in carrying out his policies, he says that "it is one of the fatal consequences of efficient centralisation that the politician's blindness (in not seeing the actual cost of the implementation of his policies) is measured by the distance over which the writ is enforced." The weakest study is that of Hitler. But perhaps the evil of such a personality is beyond the power of a normal human being to grasp and describe.

FRANK EYCK.

*Men of Destiny.* By H. C. O'Neil. Phoenix House. 18s.

## JEWISH CONVERTS

The fact that in this century a steadily increasing number of distinguished Jews have accepted Christianity has hitherto escaped attention. Yet it is most significant. As Father Oesterreicher writes in his foreword, the wall, erected by Jewish unbelief and Gentile persecution, between the Jews and Christ is now giving way, and, as is to be expected, faith in Christ is followed by a new vision of the Church. As representatives of this movement towards Christianity the author chooses seven philosophers of varying eminence: Henri Bergson, whom he describes as the Philosopher of Experience, Edmund Husserl, Acolyte of Truth, Paul Landsberg, Defender of Hope, Max Picard, Poet of the Human Face, Adolf Reinach, Seeker of the Absolute, Max Scheler, Critic of Modern Man, and Edith Stein, Witness of Love. Two of these, Paul Landsberg and Edith Stein, the Carmelite nun, perished as victims of Nazi persecution. There are others like Max Jacob or Simone Weil who might have been included, had not the book been limited to philosophers.

The epithets characterising each philosopher reveal fundamental differences of character and method. The philosophical integrity and painstaking care of the founder of the phenomenological school is diametrically opposed to the brilliance and inaccuracy of Max Scheler, who exerted such a profound influence on students in Germany during the third decade of this century. The poetic intuition of the Swiss Jew seems to have nothing in common with the Frenchman's demand for exactness, clarity and precision. Yet all are one in their relentless pursuit of truth. With infinite care the thought processes, leading these thinkers to Christianity, are traced and their findings tested against the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. Often enough it is a task of recognising ancient truths in modern garb, for in each case the tenets of Catholicism are discovered and defended. The superiority of spirit over matter, the reality of creation, the objectivity of truth and goodness, the immortality of the soul, the fall of man and his redemption are reaffirmed, and the entire contemporary trend of philosophical thought towards atheistic materialism reversed. In view of the latent danger of anti-semitism, which holds the Jews responsible for destructive thought, it is most important that "the Christian thought of Jewish thinkers" should have played so prominent a part in this reversal.

Though the professional philosopher may object to the lack of conciseness in the representation of the various philosophical arguments, the less experienced reader will benefit by this very defect and especially by the biographical data which give colour to the portraits of these thinkers. Father Oesterreicher's book may well serve as a commentary to a remark made recently by Martin Buber: "it is highly characteristic that in the springtime of modern society, spiritually significant Jews turned to Christianity, not for the sake of Christian religion, but for the sake of Christian culture, whereas today the sympathies worth noting that spiritual Jews feel for Christianity are rooted rather in a sense of religious lack and a feeling of religious longing."

DR. IRENE MARINOFF.

*Walls are Crumbling.* By John M. Oesterreicher with a Foreword by Jacques Maritain. Hollis and Carter. 30s.

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